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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE A.B.A. REPORT
AND RESOLUTIONS
ROY M. COHN*
THOMAS A. BOLAN*

O NFebruary 24,

INTRODUCTION

1959, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Associatioh, acting on the report and recommendations of its Special
Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, passed five
resolutions dealing directly or indirectly with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on matters of internal security.1
In its report, the Special Committee stated that the Supreme Court, in
many cases, had unnecessarily limited national and state security efforts,
thus encouraging increased communist activity in the United States; that
the "paralysis of our internal security grows largely from construction
and interpretation centering around technicalities emanating from our
judicial process . . .,,; and that the majority of the Supreme Court has
failed "to recognize the underground forces that are at work and to appreciate how these decisions affect our internal security." 3 The Committee summarized twenty-four cases "criticized by the public, public
officials, and the bar in varying degrees as illustrative of how our security
has been weakened . . . ."I Its report also contained a detailed analysis
of communist tactics and strategy, stating that it is a fallacy to assume
that communist power in the United States is diminishing because the
party is dwindling in numbers, and concluded that the "danger and the
menace of communism are worse than ever." 5
Using its report as a basis, the Committee submitted to the House of
Delegates' five resolutions which were adopted by the House with but a
few minor changes. Under its procedures, the House of Delegates did not
and could not have approved the report itself.7
* Members of the New York Bar.
1. For the full text of the resolutions and the debate preceding their adoption see 45
A.B.A.J. 406-10 (1959) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Resolutions]. The full text of the
report may be found in 105 Cong. Rec. A1470-81 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1959) [hereinafter cited
as A.B.A. Report].
2. A.B.A. Report at A1472.
3. Id. at A1473.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at A1480.
6. The Board of Governors, in transmitting to the House of Delegates its approval of
these resolutions, issued a statement saying "that its [the Board of Governors] action did
not 'in any way intend to indicate censure of the Supreme Court of the United States.'"
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.
7. In approving the resolutions, the Board of Governors said: "'The recommendation
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The resolutions and their prefatory language may be summed up as
follows:,
(1) While members of the Association view some of the decisions of
the Supreme Court as unsound and incorrect, the Association disapproves
proposals to limit any jurisdiction vested in the Court. Where decisions
of the Court weaken internal security, remedial legislation should be
enacted by Congress, including a pronouncement that state statutes proscribing sedition against the United States shall have concurrent enforceability.
(2) Declarations by the Supreme Court to the effect that the House of
Representatives has not been specific enough in defining the authority of
the House Un-American Activities Committee have impeded the work of
Congress, and the House of Representatives should, therefore, clarify its
delegation of authority to this Committee.
(3) Subpoenas issued by congressional committees should be accompanied by a written copy of the precise terms of the committee's basic
authority.
(4) Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have created
problems of safeguarding national and state security and have been
severely criticized as unsound by many responsible authorities. These
problems are best resolved by a careful study of each decision and the
prompt enactment by Congress of legislation to remedy any defect in
existing law revealed by these decisions. In order to eliminate obstacles
to the preservation of our internal security, legislation should be enacted
in the following areas:
(a) Amendment of the Smith Act to define the word "organize" as including
activities of an organizational nature;
(b) amendment of the Smith Act to make it a crime intentionally to advocate
or teach the necessity of violent overthrow of the United States Government;
(c) establishment of the right of each branch of the Government to require as a
condition of employment that an employee shall not refuse to answer a query as to
subversive activities or as to any other matter bearing upon his loyalty;
(d) the executive branch should be permitted to deport any aliens who were
or became communists at any time subsequent to entry into the United States; to
enforce reasonable restrictions on aliens awaiting deportation to prevent them from
engaging in activities on which their deportation order was based with the right
to interrogate them concerning subversive associates or activities; and
(e) political propaganda by agents of foreign principals be labeled for what
it is where such agents are outside the United States but nevertheless directly or
indirectly disseminating such propaganda within the United States.
for approval, in the case of this report as in the case of all other reports of Association
Sections and Committees, does not constitute endorsement of statements in the report
itself, such statements being those of the individual members of the Committee.'" Malone,
The Communist Resolutions: What the House of Delegates Really Did, 45 A.B.A.J. 343,
346 (1959).
8. A.B.A. Report, at A1471-72.
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(5) The Sub-Committee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the House Un-American Activities Committee have performed a great service to the nation and continuation of their work is
essential. Said committees should maintain close liaison with the Attorney
General and intelligence and security agencies.
The resolutions of the House of Delegates were greeted favorably in
many quarters but met with a storm of disapproval in others. Joseph
L. Rauh, Jr., former National Chairman of the Americans for Demo9
cratic Action termed the resolution "a disgrace to the legal profession."
Warren Olney III, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, resigned from the A.B.A., stating that the action taken
was " 'so discreditable to the Association that I do not want to be identified with the organization any longer.' " 0 He charged that the delegates'
action was "'inconsistent with their professional obligations, as lawyers,
to the courts.'

"I

The American Civil Liberties Union stated that the report on the
Supreme Court was "'unprofessional and irresponsible'" and showed a
"'surprising disregard for fundamental human rights.'

I t12
maintained

that the American Bar Association "'has done a serious disservice upon
the internal security of our country, the rights of people within it, and
the concept of equal justice under the law as enunciated by the Supreme
Court of the United States.' " The Union denounced the report as " 'unworthy of the intellectual standard the bar should represent and the
standards of professional ethics required by the A.B.A.' 'l It also stated
that the House of Delegates had ignored the fact that the Special Committee was "'dominated by members intimately identified with the Federal security program.' "'5
The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York City Bar
Association concluded that the A.B.A. resolutions had caused "concern
and confusion" and had left an unfortunate "impression that recent decisions have endangered our security and that the Court has been insufficiently mindful of security needs." 6 It also criticized the A.B.A. for
not mentioning that some Supreme Court decisions involving com9. N.Y. Post, March 2, 1959, p. 19, cols. 1-2.
10. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1959, p. 17, col. 3.
11. Ibid.
12. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.
13. Id. at 82, col 8.
14. Id. at 82, col. 1.
15. Id. at 1, col. 3.
16. Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation on the American Bar Association
Recommendations Concerning Legislation to Alter the Effects of Recent Decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 14 Record of N.Y.C.BA. 241 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 14 Record].
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munism were favorable to the Government. 7 The National Lawyers
Guild warned that the A.B.A. action constituted " 'a grave threat to the
civil rights and liberties of the people.' ,,18
An expected source of criticism was the Communist Party which denounced the members of the Special Committee as "witch-hunters" and
"reactionary corporation lawyers.'"
In the face of this controversy, the President of the American Bar
Association admonished that labeling of the resolutions of the House of
Delegates as an attack upon the Supreme Court was "wholly unjustified
and contrary to fact."2 The Attorney General of the United States was
quoted as stating that he did not consider the Association resolutions as
an attack upon the Court."' Members of the New York State Bar Association also recently became "embroiled" in a controversy as to whether
the A.B.A. had expressed criticism of the Supreme Court.2 The A.B.A.
Committee on the Bill of Rights has announced its disagreement with
the conclusions of the Special Committee. 3
A reading of the report and accompanying resolutions compels the
conclusion that the A.B.A. did in fact criticize the Supreme Court, not
as an institution, but rather as the author of poor decisions. Insofar as
it relates to Supreme Court decisions, an accurate and simple summary
of the Special Committee's report would be that the Committee disapproved of certain Supreme Court decisions and, because of their adverse
affect on our internal security efforts, the Committee believed that these
decisions should be remedied by legislation. The authors of this article
believe that the report and the resolutions of the American Bar Association are justified. The type of criticism which has been generally aimed
at the A.B.A. illustrates a double standard in thinking prevalent among
some liberal quarters today which has frequently manifested itself in
Supreme Court rulings as well. It consists of the application of one set
of rules for the liberal side and another for those of different persuasions.
It is particularly employed when any problem arises in connection with
"civil liberties," particularly in the area of subversion.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that there is nothing
unusual or improper about the manner in which the A.B.A. criticized the
17. Id. at 247.
18. Report of the National Lawyers Guild on the Recommendations of the American
Bar Association in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Proposed Antisubversion Legislation of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 235 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearingsl.
19. Shields, Witchhunters Steer Bar Association Against Liberty, The Worker, March 22,
1959, p. 7, cols. 1-5.
20. Malone, supra note 7, at 346.
21. N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 23, 1959, p. 8, col. 2.
22. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1959, § 1, p. 53, col. 3.
23. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1959, p. 29, col. 8. See also N.J.L.J., Aug. 20, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
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Supreme Court, and further that, on the merits, such criticism was completely warranted. An historical review of Supreme Court criticism will
demonstrate the lack of impropriety or uniqueness in the A.B.A. action.
A survey of the cases which the resolutions seek to remedy, as well as
others mentioned in the Special Committee's report, will demonstrate
that the A.B.A.'s conclusions do have a solid basis.
I.

CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court as an institution under our form of government
should not be altered since the Court serves as a vital check on any abuse
of power by the other two governmental branches and by the states.
Impatience with certain holdings is certainly no justification for taking
drastic action against the Court's basic structure. Any deficiencies in
decisions may be cured by corrective legislation or constitutional amendment, if necessary.
However, this does not mean that the Supreme Court should remain
immune to criticism. Appointment to this bench does not per se confer
infallibility upon any individual. To deprive laymen and lawyers of the
right to analyze and reprove policy-making pronouncements of the
Supreme Court would be an undue curtailment of free speech. It is submitted that those who have spearheaded the attack on the A.B.A. resolutions are guilty of employing a double standard. When the Court-packing
program was in focus in 1937, certain liberal elements countenanced
criticism of the Supreme Court which renders that of the A.B.A. pale by
comparison. Typical of the attacks upon the Court during that era was
the following statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 9,
1937:
The court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions has improperly
set itself up as a third house of the Congress-a superlegislature, as one of the
justices has called it-reading into the Constitution words and implications which are
not there, and which were never intended to be there.
We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where we must take action
to save the Constitution from the court and the court from itself....
Our difficulty with the court today rises not from the court as an institution but
from human beings within it.2 4
At that time, these liberals sought basic structural changes in the
Supreme Court, espousing a short range view which demanded drastic,
irrevocable action because of temporary impatience. All that we urge
is the right to disagree with the Supreme Court, not the power to destroy
it, as indeed was being advocated by many of the present-day defenders
of the Court.
24. Quoted in Lawrence, Today in National Affairs, N.Y. Herald Tribune, March 6,
1956, p. 25, cols. 1-2.
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A. Criticism of the Court (1789-1920)
The history of the Supreme Court is replete with controversy, and
rarely has it not been under fire. 23 As far back as 1794, the Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,26 holding that the Constitution gave
the federal judiciary power to summon states in contract actions,
"fell upon the country with a profound shock."2 7 The House of Representatives of Georgia reacted by passing a bill providing that any
federal officer who attempted to execute process in the case was
"'guilty of felony, and should suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by
being hanged.'"28 Shortly thereafter, the Court was vigorously assailed
"'in most poignant anathema'" for upholding the Alien and Sedition
Laws.29
Thomas Jefferson's first presidential term can be characterized as
chiefly a struggle against the Supreme Court. Jefferson stated that it
was a "very dangerous doctrine to consider the judges the ultimate
arbiters of all constitutional questions,"3 referring to the Court as
" 'subtle sappers and miners, constantly working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric ... "31
President Andrew Jackson made assaults upon the Supreme Court an
element of Jacksonian democracy. 2 In voicing defiance of one Supreme
Court ruling, Jackson is reputed to have said, "John Marshall has
''
pronounced his judgment: let him enforce it if he can." 33
In 1834, the Supreme Court was depicted as the "great engine"
of Congress, consecrating the latter's unconstitutional laws.3 4 President
25. See Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. Rev. 1, 161
(1913), for a detailed account of the numerous attacks on the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court during the period from its inception up through 1913.
26. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 415 (1793).
27. 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 96 (rev. ed. 1932).
28. Quoted in 1 Boudin, Government by Judiciary 129 (1932).
29. Speech of Henry Lee before Congress, Jan. 23, 1801, quoted in Warren, Congress,
the Constitution and the Supreme Court 121 (rev. ed. 1935).
30. Foley, Jeffersonian Cyclopedia 845-46 (1900).
31. Warren, op. cit. supra note 29, at 196. Violent attacks were made on the Court for
its decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), upholding the
congressional charter of the Bank of the United States, and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), which affirmed federal writs of error to state court judgments.
32. "The Congress, the Executive and the Court must each for itself be guided by its
own opinion of the constitution . . . . The authority of the Supreme Court must not,
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may
deserve." 2 Richardson, Messages of the Presidents 582 (1896).
33. Quoted in 1 Bryce, The American Commonwealth 269 (3d ed. 1895).
34. Statement of Congressman Warren R. Davis of South Carolina, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, quoted in Warren, op. cit. supra note 29, at 197.
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Martin van Buren "complained bitterly of the encroachments of the
Supreme court, and declared that it would never have been created had
the people foreseen the powers it would acquire. 3 5
The most violent onslaught against the Court took place during the
ten-year period after the passage of the fugitive slave law in 1850. The
famous Lincoln-Douglas debates revolved mainly about the Dred Scott"5
decision. Lincoln maintained that while the decision controlled Dred
Scott, he, Lincoln, would not be bound by it. 7
In 1873, the Court was censured for being too conservative and promonopoly, while a few years later it was deemed in turn radical,
39
anti-corporation, and anti-railroad., s In 1884, the Court's decision
declaring legal tender laws constitutional in both peace and war was
assailed for foisting upon the country, dishonest, oppressive and unconstitutional legislation.40 Labor, for its part, was denouncing the
Court in 1908 for allegedly favoring capitalists and employers.4 1
In 1912, Gustavus Myers, author of a history of the Supreme Court,
' '42
depicted the latter as the stronghold of " 'reactionary' capitalism.
Senator Robert M. La Follette, in a stinging rebuke, asserted that:
The regard of the Courts for fossilized precedent, their absorption in technicalities,
their detachment from the vital living facts of the present day, their constant thinking on the side of the rich and powerful and privileged classes, have brought our
Courts into conflict with the democratic spirit and purpose of this generation. Moreover ... by presuming to read their own views into statutes without regard to the
plain intention of the legislators
they have become in reality the supreme law-giving
43
institution of our government.

B. Criticism of the Court (1920-1937)
Liberals today who condemn any criticism of the Supreme Court are
those who a few years ago sought to destroy its role in our government.
Little research is needed to unearth evidence of this during the period
between 1920 and 1937.
35. 1 Bryce, op. cit.
supra note 33, at 268 n.2.
36. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
37. See 1 Boudin, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 29-33. In commenting on this case, the
New York Tribune charged that the Court had "rushed into politics" and that the decision was "entitled to just as much weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those
congregated in any Washington barroom." Quoted in Williams, The Law of the Land,
National Review, Dec. 22, 1956, p. 16.
38. Warren, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 269.
39. Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
40. Bancroft, The Constitution Wounded in the House of Its Guardians, cited in 1
Boudin, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 23.
41. Warren, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 269.
42. Quoted in Palmer, Causes of Dissents: Judicial Self-Restraint or Abdication, 34
A.BAJ. 761, 763 (1948).
43. Ibid.
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In the early 1920's, the Court was taken to task for its alleged suppression of freedom of speech.44 During this same period, labor leaders,
radicals, and sociologists challenged the right of the Court to render
any decision regarding the validity of a federal statute.4" In 1924,
Norman Thomas advocated curtailment of the power of the Supreme
Court because it had declared anti-injunction legislation unconstitutional.46 That same year, the Supreme Court Justices were being
accused by liberals of invoking "their own social and economic views
as against the social and economic views of the majority of Congress." 4 7
In 1930, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho alleged that the Supreme
Court had become, under the fourteenth amendment, the " 'economic
dictator in the United States,' "4 while Louis Boudin was writing in
1932 that "there is a steady course of absorption of power by the United
States Supreme Court at the expense of all other departments of government and of the people themselves." 9
In May 1935, the Attorney General of the United States wrote President Roosevelt that "apparently there are at least four justices who are
against any attempt to use the power of the Federal Government for
bettering general conditions, except within the narrowest limitations.""
President Roosevelt, in turn, sarcastically referred to the Court as belonging in "the horse-and-buggy days."'"
Louis Boudin again wrote in 1937 that the Supreme Court was "a law
unto itself" and had "diminished our civil rights by giving to the
Constitution a narrow interpretation-often flying in the face of established legal principles and the clear language of the document."52 He
real
added that the Court had deprived remaining civil rights of any 53
content by preventing the federal government from protecting them.
Certainly, the criticism of the Supreme Court as found in the report
of the A.B.A. Special Committee is mild in comparison to some of these
pronouncements by noted liberals. Not only is the criticism much milder,
but the remedy proposed by the A.B.A., amendatory legislation, is much
less drastic than some of the measures championed by liberals in the
past. For example, Senator La Follette proposed a constitutional
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
1937).
53.

See Warren, op. cit. supra note 29, at 270.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 132 n.1.
The Red Demon of Judicial Reform, New Republic, Oct. 1, 1924, p. 110.
Quoted in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1930, p. 18, col. 3.
2 Boudin, op. cit. supra note 28, at 548-59.
Milton, The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943, at 277 (1944).
Taylor, Grand Inquest, The Story of Congressional Investigations 68 (1955).
Boudin, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights, Science & Soc'y 274, 309 (Spring
Id. at 309.
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amendment providing that a federal statute held unconstitutional by the
Court and enacted by Congress a second time by at least a two-thirds
majority could not thereafter be held unconstitutional. 5 4 When Supreme
Court decisions met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's disapproval,
he unsuccessfully attempted to "pack the Court" in 1937 by proposing
legislation which would permit him to nominate an additional Justice
for each Justice who did not retire at the age of seventy, the Court not to
exceed fifteen members. 5 Six of the Justices then on the Court were over
seventy.
In the light of this history, it is clear that present liberal support
of the Supreme Court is due mainly to the latter's issuance of favorable
pronouncements.5 ; When decisions were objectionable, however, these
same elements were quick to criticize the Court and propose extreme
remedies to curtail its influence. Mr. Justice Black, when a Senator, supported President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. 7 Indeed,
the history of criticism aimed at the Court shows that "those who have
attacked the Court for a decision to-day have often been the very
persons to praise it for another decision to-morrow."58 The Supreme
Court has been denounced so frequently that it is almost true that
"one ordinarily need go no further than his favorite historical character
to find some juicy tidbit of invective."59 History, therefore, reveals
nothing that is unusual in the manner or tone of the A.B.A. criticism.
C. The Justices and Criticism of the Court
Members of the Supreme Court have often declared that criticism of
the Court is beneficial and not harmful.' As Mr. Justice Brewer stated
in 1898:
It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped
by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and character
of its justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subjected to the freest criticism .... True, many criticisms may be, like their
author, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism at all. 6'
54. Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court 138 (1925).
55. Milton, op. cit. supra note 50, at 278.
56. See, e.g., Westin, When the Public judges the Court, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1959, § 6
(Magazine), p. 16.
57. Palmer, The Court and the Popular Will: What Is Their True Function in Our Legal
System?, 35 A.BA.J. 101, 104 n.18 (1949).
58. Warren, op. cit. supra note 54, at 270-71.
59. Dunsford & Childress, Attacks on the Supreme Court, 4 Catholic Law. 57 (1958).
60. Chief Justice Warren of the present Court apparently does not subscribe to this
view, it having been reported that he has resigned from the American Bar Association
because of its adverse criticism of the Court. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 23, 1959,
p. 8, cols. 1-2. See also Malone, The President's Page, 45 A.B.A.J. 317, 324 (1959).
61. 15 Nat. Corp. Rep. 848, 849 (1898).
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In Bridges v. California,6" Mr. Justice Black maintained that to
assume that respect for the judiciary could be obtained by insulating
judges from published criticism was an erroneous appraisal of the
character of American public opinion.6 3 He observed that "it is a prized
American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions."' Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the same case, pointed out that because of their judicial office,
judges may become oblivious of their common human frailties and
fallibilities, and have, at times, even been martinets on the bench.6 5
"Therefore," he claimed, "judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of
criticism expressed with candor however blunt."66
Along the same lines, Mr. Justice Stone denied that criticism of
judicial action bespoke lack of respect for the courts. On the contrary,
he urged that "where the courts deal, as ours do, with great public questions, the only protection against unwise decisions, and even judicial
usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment on
it."67 Mr. Justice Jackson wrote that "acceptance of criticism by the
profession" is one of the most important criteria in determining a decision's "real weight in subsequent cases."681
Needless to say, some of the most vigorous attacks on Supreme Court
decisions have come from dissenting members of the Court itself, "whose
right to criticize the actions of the judicial department are no less and
no greater than that of the humblest American citizen.1 69 A few quotations from the opinions of some recent members of the Court will suffice
shown little or no restraint in
to show that the Justices have 7frequently
0
criticizing their own colleagues.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has referred to "the careful ambiguities and
silences of the majority opinion" ;71 depicted one decision as "purely
destructive legislation"; 2 and with respect to another claimed that "the
Court's opinion has only its own reasoning to support it."173 Mr. Justice
62. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
63. Id. at 270.
64. Ibid.
65. Id. at 289.
66. Ibid.
67. Quoted in Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Warren 205 (1958).
68. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System 13 (1955).
69. 45 A.B.A.J. 367 (1959) (editorial).
70. See Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings: A Study of Developments in the Supreme
Court, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (1948).
71. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941).
72. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 179 (1942).
73. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603 (1946).
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Black once accused the majority of "judicial amendment" of the Constitution. 4 In another case, he saw the majority acting as a "'superlegislature' "175 ignoring a "century and a half of constitutional history
and government."7 On another occasion, he accused the Court of avoiding "orderly analysis and discussion," 7 7 wresting quotations "from their

setting and context,"78 and concluded that "the general principle that
nothing added to nothing will not add up to something holds true in
this case. ' 7' Mr. Justice Black characterized a Frankfurter dissent as
resting on "the writer's personal views on 'morals' and 'ethics.' ,o Black
charged that for "judges to rest their interpretation of statutes on nothing
but their own conception of 'morals' and 'ethics' is, to say the least,
dangerous business.""'
Mr. Justice Douglas once declared that a majority opinion was
"written on a hypothetical state of facts, not on the facts presented by
the record,"8 2 and referred to a part of the opinion as "neither good
sense nor good law. Such a result makes the way easy for the traitor,
does violence to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind."83 Mr.
Justice Clark has complained that the Court "disregards its plain re-4
sponsibilities" and avoids constitutional issues by use of "a pretext";
and in another case said that the Court "should not be 'that blind' court
...that does not see what '[a]ll others can see and understand.... "5
Criticism of the Supreme Court by its own members has not always
been confined to official opinions. In one of his recent works, Mr. Justice
Douglas alleges that the Supreme Court at times "has even been swept
by hysteria, becoming little more than an executor for those who preached
intolerance." 8 6 He adds that the greatest claim to judicial supremacy
made by the Supreme Court was on behalf of "vested interests that were
callous to human rights."8 7
74. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938).
75. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945). Mr. Justice Brandeis was
the first member of the Court to refer to his brethren as a "super-legislature." Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (dissent).
76. 325 U.S. at 789.
77. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 33 (1945).
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 673 (1944).
81. Ibid.
82. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945).
83. Id. at 67.
84. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1956).
85. Greene v. McElroy, 79 Sup. Ct. 1400, 1427 (1959) (dissent).
86. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 104 (1954).

87. Ibid.
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with Mr. Justice

Black over the latter's participation in Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local
6167, UMW.89 Jackson also charged that the 1937 Court was guilty of
"'usurpation," "unwarranted interferences with lawful government activities," and "tortured construction of the Constitution." 90
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "Judges as persons, or courts
as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than
other persons or institutions." 9' The Court should not be any more
above criticism than are other branches of the Government. Men entrusted with the responsibility of public office "incur the possibility of
criticism and unfavorable review of their public and official actions. 9 2
As one writer has aptly commented:
An institution is only as good as the men who manage it and in many countries, the
instruments of justice and right have been corrupted if not by money then by the
corrosive activities of incorrectly oriented men . 93. . . In a country of free men, no
institution of government must never be criticized.

II.

ASSERTION BY THE COURT OF ITS PERSONAL

VIEWS AND

DISREGARD OF STARE DECISIS

There are those who maintain that the present Supreme Court is
preserving the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution. Such
statements usually mean nothing more than that the individuals making
them happen to agree with the Supreme Court's notion of what constitutes
these "civil liberties." Constitutional "guarantees" do not enter into
the picture at all, because the language of the Constitution necessarily
yields to the views of a majority of five members of the Supreme Court.
A man who is today "guaranteed" by the Constitution against going to
prison may wind up in jail tomorrow if five judges believe that is where
he belongs.
Nothing is more evident from a study of Supreme Court decisions
than the truth of Charles Evans Hughes' statement that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is." 94 Many others learned in the law have
readily accepted this principle. 5 Mr. Justice Harlan has explained: "If
88.

Palmer, supra note 70, at 555.

89.

325 U.S. 161 (1945).

90. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 189 (1941).
91. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941).
92. 45 A.B.A.J. 262 (1959) (editorial).
93. Sokolsky, The Bar's Report On Reds and Court, N.Y. Journal-American, March 7,
1959, p. 20, cols. 7-8.
94. Charles Evans Hughes, Addresses and Papers 185-86 (2d ed. 1916).
95. "The Constitution has ceased to be the measure of the Judicial Power or any check
or limit to the judges' exercise of the power to declare legislation unconstitutional. The
Judges have in fact become superior not only to the Legislature but to the Constitution
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we [the Court] don't like an act of Congress, we don't have much trouble
to find grounds for declaring it unconstitutional."9' 6
Article V of the Constitution provides that the latter may be amended
only when two thirds of both Houses or two thirds of the state legislatures
propose an amendment, which then must be ratified by three fourths
of the states. However, five Justices may, and often have, accomplished the same result by the stroke of a penY7 A striking illustration of this occurred recently in two cases involving servicemen's wives
who had been convicted by military courts-martial of murdering their
husbands while overseas. On June 11, 1956, the Supreme Court upheld
their convictions, stating that the trial of a civilian-dependent of a
serviceman by a court-martial for offenses committed overseas did not
violate the Constitution. However, this very same Constitution, not
a word changed, almost one year later gave defendants their freedom, the
Court holding on rehearing that their trials were unconstitutional. 9
Nothing new had been added or changed.'
The only thing that had
changed was the composition of the Court and the mind of one of its
members.' 0 '
Since the judicial determination of close constitutional questions depends
in large measure upon the composition of the Court at the time the issue10is2
argued, it is obvious that chance plays a great role in our Government.
This point has been convincingly made as follows: "Mr. Justice A dies
in February instead of March. President B appoints his successor. Had
itself, since the Constitution is what the judges say it is." Foreword to 1 Boudin, Government By judiciary at vi (1932). (Original italics omitted.) "[Tlhe only check on our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Mr. Justice Stone dissenting in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936). Due process "is a matter which in the last
analysis depends upon the Court's own discretion and nothing else." Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 254 (12th ed. 1958).
96. Quoted in Foreword to Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren at vii
(1958).
97. "[T]he court, in interpreting the Constitution, may and does, positively amend or
change it." Frederick R. Coudert, quoted in 2 Boudin, Government by judiciary 373
(1932). (All italicized in original.)
98. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
99. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
100. See analysis of decision in McLaren, Constitutional Law: Military Trials of
Civilians, 45 A.BA.J. 255 (1959).
101. Many other instances could be cited to show how a change in personnel has resulted in a complete switch in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584, rev'd on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
102. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has admonished his colleagues: "Especially ought the Court
not reenforce needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that
Law is the expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's composition and the contingencies in the choice of successors." United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (dissent).
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he lived a month longer, President C would have appointed his successor,
the case of Smith v. Jones would be decided the other way, and the
future course of history be changed."' 10 3 The details of our judicial history
"show how decisions of the gravest political consequence, decisions affecting the welfare of the people and the destinies of the country, frequently depended on the will or whim of some one Man, or on the accident of whether this or that Man happened to sit in the seat of power."'0 4
The element of chance is present, of course, because five individuals
decide each Supreme Court case. Each member brings to the bench his
own personal habits of mind as well as his ethical, political, social and
economic attitudes. To these must be added his legal training and personal conception of the function of a Supreme Court Justice. All of
these factors, of course, vary greatly from man to man, and "how the
Constitution will be interpreted by these men depends in part upon what
kind of men they are and how the world looks to them."'0 5 Personal
feuds within the Court itself will sometimes influence decisions, 0 ' while
even the political leanings of law clerks selected by the Justices may
have a considerable bearing on the cases heard by the Court.
Although the personal viewpoints of the individual Justices cannot help
but affect their opinions somewhat, the Justices are expected to regard the
law impartially. Mr. Justice Holmes, among others, scored any deviation
from this strict requirement of objectivity:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the every
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe

to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly
any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a
majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or
seems
moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower reason that
10 7
to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which I have referred.

In recent years, members of the Supreme Court, more than ever before, have allowed their own personal views to influence or dictate the
Court's decisions. This is due primarily to an abandonment during the
past two decades of the rule of stare decisis."'0 Mr. Justice Douglas,
103. Whitney, The Insular Decisions of December, 1901, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 79 (1902).
104. Foreword to 1 Boudin, Government By Judiciary at viii (1932).
105. Pritchett, The American Constitution 48 (1959).
106. See, e.g., Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 1947, Fortune, Jan. 1947, p. 73.
107. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissent). Note also his dissenting
statement in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
108. The status of the doctrine today has been termed "very shaky indeed." Corwin,
The Constitution and What It Means Today 192 (7th ed. 1947). In the entire history of
the Court before 1932 only 29 reversals of previous decisions had taken place. Gordon,
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apparently echoing the sentiments of some of his brethren, has stated
that stare decisis has "little place in American constitutional law."'10 9 In
1953, Mr. Justice Jackson voiced what thus continues to be a major
criticism of the Court:
Rightly or wrongly, the belief is widely held by the practicing profession that this
Court no longer respects impersonal rules of law but is guided in these matters by
personal impressions which from time to time may be shared by a majority of Justices. Whatever has been intended, this Court also has generated an impression ...
that regard for precedents and authorities is obsolete, that words no longer mean
what they have always meant to the profession, that the law knows no fixed
principles. 110

The doctrine of stare decisis had previously greatly reduced the assertion of personal opinions in judicial decisions and rendered a measure
of stability to the law. In disregarding it, the Court has run roughshod
over precedent and thoroughly revamped our constitutional law.:" In
so doing, the Court has created considerable uncertainty in the law"'
causing its prestige to be greatly diminished." 3 Moreover, the frequency
of dissents has also contributed to a lessening of respect for the Court."'
Nine Men Against America 149 (1958). Mr. Justice Douglas asserts that during the period
between 1937 and 1947 the Supreme Court overruled 30 decisions, 21 involving constitutional questions, with the great majority of them having been decided within the previous
20 years. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 48 (1954).
109. Douglas, We the Judges 429 (1956).
110. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 535 (1953) (concurring opinion).
Ill. See, e.g., Corwin, op. cit. supra note 108, at 254.
112. "Under our constitutional system, moreover, an undiscriminating disregard of stare
decisis by our Supreme Court in the interests of particular classes, groups, or philosophies
has a peculiarly deleterious and disturbing effect." Precedent and Certainty in Law and
Life, 34 A.B.A.J. 919, 920 (1948) (editorial). (Italics omitted.)
113. "Respect for courts must fall when the public and the profession come to understand that decisions are to have only contemporaneous value and that nothing that has
been said in prior adjudication has force in a current controversy." Schwartz, The Supreme
Court, Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect 353 (1957).
114. "The present fragmentation of the Court diminishes its prestige and substitutes
for what was once regarded as the sacred oracular voice of an impersonal institution a
babel of confused and jangling human tongues. It introduces a strong element of instability
and unpredictability into the law that causes great concern and perplexity to counsel
charged with the responsibility of advising clients and to the lower courts." Palmer,
Present Dissents: Causes of the Justices' Disagreements, 35 A.B.A.J. 189 (1949). Lack of
unanimity "is disastrous because disunity cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on
which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends. People become aware that
the answer to the controversy is uncertain, even to those best qualified, and they feel free,
unless especially docile, to ignore it if they are reasonably sure that they will not be
caught." Hand, L., The Bill of Rights 72 (1958). The increase in dissents is indicated by
the following percentages of non-unanimous opinions per term; 1910, 13%; 1920, 17%;
1930, 11%; 1935, 16%; 1940, 28%; 1943-1944, 58%; 1945, 56%0; 1946, 64%;

1951,

807; 1952, 71%; 1953, 64%; 1954, 60%; 1955, 58%. Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings:
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It is not suggested by any means that the Court should never overrule
previous decisions, but it is submitted that such action should be taken
only under extraordinary circumstances, such as radically changed conditions brought about by a long passage of time. The only criterion for
overruling used by certain members of the present Court seems to be
merely their disagreement with a previous decision.
Disregard of precedent is a particular tendency of Justices Black,
Douglas, Warren and Brennan who are said to adhere to that school of
thought which believes that a judge should decide a case by first determining in his own mind what the law should be and then examining precedent
for such use as may be made of it." 5 Under this view, the judge becomes
a substitute for the legislator and decides what is best for the community." 6
The danger of having the Court, or rather five Justices, presume
to decide whether a law is good or bad for the people is, of course,
obvious. In the first place, such procedure runs contrary to the principles of representative democracy, on which our nation is founded,
and usurps the prerogatives and functions of the legislature. In the
second place, mere ascendancy to the bench does not automatically endow
a Justice with superior wisdom. Justices, like other human beings, may
be careless with facts and reckless with opinions." 7
The case of Schware v. Board of Examiners,"' cited in the A.B.A.
Special Committee's report, 1 9 is but one of many cases where the Court
substituted its own personal policy-making views for the judgment of
those whose function it is to make policy. In this case, the Court stated
that New Mexico had no right to deny a man, otherwise qualified, admission to the bar because he had been a member of the Communist Party,
used aliases, and had a record of arrests. While reasonable men may
differ as to the applicant's fitness under these circumstances, surely it
A Study of Developments in the Supreme Court, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (1948); Schwartz, op.
cit. supra note 113, at 357, 402.
115. Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 201; Shannon, Earl Warren: Center of the Storm,
N.Y. Post, May 17, 1959, § 2 (Magazine), p. 2.
116. It is easy for a jurist to believe that it is necessary to assume such a role if, for
example, he has so little regard for the common sense of the American people that he can
say that they are too quick to identify anyone who supports equal rights for Negroes as
a communist because that happens to be a part of the Communist Party line. Douglas,
The Right of the People 93 (1958).
117. For example, Mr. Justice Douglas states in his Almanac of Liberty that during
1952, in New York City alone, there were at least 58,000 orders issued allowing wiretaps.
Douglas, Almanac of Liberty 355 (1954). As a matter of fact, only 480 orders were so
issued. See Silver, Legalized Wire-tapping Necessary to Combat Streamlined Efficiency of
Organized Crime, Harv. L. Record, Feb. 27, 1958, p. 3, col. 3.
118. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
119. A.B.A. Report at A1474.
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was improper for the Court to interfere with New Mexico's judgment in
the matter.10
Some of the present Justices apparently believe that the Communist
Party is merely another political organization and that many of its
members are simply harmless, misguided idealists.' 21 Dealing sympathetically with a Party member is not difficult when one has such views.
Since these Justices also do not feel bound by precedent and believe
that they are the final judges of what is good for the community, all
the more readily does the Communist Party member become the beneficiary of a favorable decision.
An analysis of Supreme Court decisions as of 1958 reveals the favored
treatment received by communist or subversive defendants at the hands
of certain Justices. As of the time the survey was made, Mr. Justice
Black had participated in 71 decisions involving communists or internal
security matters, and each time ruled against the Government; Mr.
Justice Douglas was anti-Government in 66 out of 69 such cases; Chief
Justice Warren in 36 out of 39; and Mr. Justice Brennan in 18 out of
20 cases." 2 The Government's "batting average" has not improved
since.
The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York City Bar
Association, in commenting on the report of the A.B.A. Special Committee, stated that the Court's decisions in four cases2 3 "demonstrate
graphically that the Court is fully mindful of the nation's stake in protection against Communism' ' 24 and depicted as "outstanding"' 125 the decision in United States v. Ullmann, 2 ' which upheld the constitutionality
120. Along the same line is the case of Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252
(1957), wherein the Court said it was improper for California to refuse an applicant
admission to the bar because he had declined to answer questions as to present and past
communist membership.
121. Mr. Justice Douglas has referred to communists as "peddlers of unwanted ideas.
They were more thoroughly investigated and exposed than any group in our history.
They were the most unpopular people in the land ....
Yet the Court sanctioned the suppression of speech which Congress determined to be 'dangerous.'" Douglas, The Right of
the People 51 (1958).
See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black contends that people have a right "to join
organizations, advocate causes and make political 'mistakes' without later being subjected
to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves. It is this right, the
right to err politically, which keeps us strong as a Nation." Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (dissent).
122. 104 Cong. Rec. 12121-22 (daily ed. July 10, 1958) (remarks of Senator Eastland).
123. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399
(1958); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
22 (1956). See 14 Record at 248.
124. 14 Record at 249.
125. Id. at 247.
126. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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of a recently-enacted immunity statute. The A.B.A. Special Committee,
of course, did not allege that there were no internal security cases decided
in favor of the Government, but instead asserted that in "many" cases,
the Court's decisions had adversely affected our internal security ef127
forts.
In any event, there is nothing "graphic" about the four cases cited
by the Committee on Federal Legislation, nor is there anything "outstanding" about the Ullmann case. Inasmuch as immunity statutes of
the type involved in Ullmann had repeatedly been sanctioned since the
1896 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Walker, 2 ' it would have indeed
been astounding had the Court not decided in favor of the Government.
Moreover, in Beilan v. Board of Educ.'29 and Lerner v. Casey, 3 ° both
decided by 5-4 margins, the Court had its 1951 decision in Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works"3 ' as a square precedent. It is to be noted that
Justices Douglas and Black voted against the Government in each of
these three cases, that Chief Justice Warren voted against the Government in two of the three, and Justice Brennan in the two in which he
participated.
The fact that each of the Justices voted with the majority in some
cases cited in the A.B.A. report is not a factor of any significance. It
would indeed be remarkable if there was a Justice who never found a
communist defendant with a valid legal point. This surely would tend
to indicate a prejudice on his part. What is remarkable is that there
are four justices who practically never vote for the Government in
security cases.
Apart from the specific field of internal security, the Court has also
been extreme, but to a lesser degree, in the area of "civil liberties." Of
course, if a Justice personally believes that "the police have always been
less inclined to use their wits than their fists,"1 3 then he is apt to sympathize readily with a defendant who claims to have been victimized by the
police. An analysis of fifty civil liberty cases decided by the Court
during the 1957-58 term reveals that Mr. Justice Douglas voted against
the Government in 49, Mr. Justice Black in 45, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
in 42 (out of 48) and Mr. Justice Brennan in 40 (out of 48) of such
cases.' 3 3 These extreme ratios suggest the imposition of personal views.
127. See A.B.A. Report at A1470. Although the A.B.A. Report cited some twenty-four
cases to illustrate the pattern of the Court's decisions, the legislation recommended by the
Special Committee was aimed at only six of them.
128. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
129. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
130.

357 U.S. 468 (1958).

131. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
132. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 240 (1954).
133. Pollitt, Should the Supreme Court be 'Curbed'? A Presentation of Civil Liberties
Decisions in the 1957-58 Term, N.C.L. Rev. 17, 53-54 (1958).
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As a result of the conduct of the Supreme Court during the past two
decades, the situation has reached a stage where:
[T]he judicial process [is] a thing of mere utility and force, tempered with emotion,
whim and intuition. The man in the street can feel the sands shifting under him.
There is no more certainty in the law since consistency is not to be expected at the
summit of the law. There are no more permanent rights, no more unalienable rights,
no more natural rights.... .34
Retirement of some of the present Justices and their replacement by

those who adhere more to the traditional role of a judge appear to
offer the best hope for a reversal of this trend.'3 5
III. THE USE OF THE "LIBERAL DOUBLE STANDARD"
We have already seen that many liberals now staunchly protesting
any criticism of the Court, as an institution or otherwise, sought to devitalize it when objectionable decisions were made. This reaction to the
A.B.A. report and resolutions is not the only example of their use of a
double standard. For example, members of the American Civil Liberties
Union would be the first to condemn those who contend that a program
or principle must be bad because Communists support it. Yet, the Union
has criticized the A.B.A. report because the Committee that prepared it
was "'dominated by members intimately identified with the Federal
security program.' ,1136 The report, of course, should be considered on
its merits, and an attack of this nature is highly improper. Inasmuch
as the report deals with internal security decisions, it is only logical
and proper that experts in that field should have participated in its
preparation.
Many liberals applaud the decision of the Supreme Court in such cases
as Watkins v. United States1 37 which severely restricted the power of
134. Sermon by Rev. Robert Gannon, S.J., Red Mass of the Catholic Lawyers Guild
of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Sept. 18, 1958, in 105 Cong. Rec. A31, 32 (daily ed. Jan. 9,
1959).
135. It has been suggested that the failure to appoint men with judicial experience has
been responsible to a great extent for the wayward course the Court has taken. Of the
twelve appointments made during the period between 1937 and 1953, eight of the Justices
had no previous judicial experience at all, one had previous experience in a police court
and another in a recorder's court, and only two, Justices Vinson and Minton, had any
experience to speak of. President Eisenhower has reversed this trend, and his last four
appointments have had at least some judicial experience. Promotions from lower courts
would indeed seem to be beneficial not only for the Supreme Court, but for federal courts
of appeal as well. Of 54 appointments to appellate courts by President Roosevelt, only 18
were from lower courts; President Truman had 15 out of 27; and of President Eisenhower's first 22 appointments, only 7 were from lower courts. Miller, The Selection of
the Federal Judiciary: The Profession is Neglecting Its Duty, 45 A.B.AJ. 445, 447 (1959).
136. Quoted in N.Y. Times, April 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 3.
137. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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Congress to investigate subversion. However, in the 1920's, when
suggestions were made to curtail congressional investigations of the Tea13 8
pot Dome scandal, they were most articulate in their opposition.
The following statement of Woodrow Wilson from his Congressional
Government was often quoted:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration; and even
more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs
which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused
in a broad daylight of discussion. . . .The informing function of Congress should
be preferred even to its legislative function.' 39

Such phrases as "the right to privacy" or "exposure for the sake of
exposure" were either shunned or criticized. In 1926, in supporting the
investigating power of Congress, Professor James M. Landis could thus
write:
It may well be that the effect of such an investigation as that of Attorney General
Daugherty in 1924 is to impeach him at the bar of public opinion; and that realizing the investigation would have such an effect, a purpose to do so was made
manifest by the Senate. But it is no answer to say ... that 'the Senate has no power
to impeach any federal officer at the bar of public opinion, no matter what possible
good may come of it.' Impeachment . . . represents only the reaction of public
opinion to the facts elicited by a Senate inquiry. Such a reaction may over-awe
of removal. In default
the Chief Executive and compel him to exercise his power
140
of such action Congress can do as it may deem necessary.

In that same era, Mr. Justice Brandeis was asked privately whether
he thought it would be a good idea for a newspaper to comment editorially that individual rights were being transgressed in the Teapot
Dome investigation. Brandeis replied in the negative, stating that "the
needful results of Congressional inquiries can be 'achieved only by complete freedom and pursuit.'""4
The extensive scope of legislative investigating power was delineated by
Louis Boudin who wrote that there is "practically nothing of any importance that occurs in 42the life of the nation or of the state that is not
of legislative concern.'
Judge Learned Hand 1 3 has referred very emphatically to a double
138. See, e.g., Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 691 (1926).
139. Wilson, Congressional Government 195-98 (Meridian ed. 1956).
140. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,
40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 220-21 (1926).
141. Quoted in Krock, In the Nation, The Civil Liberty Issue in Congressional Inquiries,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1957, p. 22, col. 5.
142. 2 Boudin, Government by Judiciary 312 (1932). Boudin criticized Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), relied upon by the Supreme Court in the Watkins case,
as "utterly unwarranted by the Constitution." Id. at 315.
143. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).
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standard which has been employed by the Supreme Court. When any
question of interference with civil liberties is involved, the Court is quick
to intervene, but when alleged infringement of property rights is the
issue, the Court has been considerably less than enthusiastic. He notes:
I cannot help thinking that it would have seemed a strange anomaly to those who
penned the words in the Fifth to learn that they constituted severer restrictions as
to Liberty than Property. . . . I can see no more persuasive reason for supposing
that a legislature is a priori less qualified to choose between 'personal' than between
economic values; and there have been strong protests, to me unanswerable, that there
asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision over
is no constitutional basis for 144
the first than over the second.

Numerous examples could be cited illustrating the different standards
used by Supreme Court members in dealing with problems relating to
subversion on the one hand, and non-subversive problems on the other.
In writing about the Teapot Dome investigations, Mr. Justice Frankfurter defended this congressional inquiry despite the attendant abuse of
individuals.' 4 5 He made several pertinent observations:
Undoubtedly, the names of people who have done nothing criminal or wrong, or
nothing even offending taste perhaps, have been mentioned in connection with these
The question is not whether people's feelings here and there may
investigations ....
be hurt or names 'dragged through the mud,' as it is called. The real issue is
whether the danger of abuses and the actual harm done are so clear and substantial
that the grave risks of fettering free congressional inquiry are to be incurred by
artificial and technical limitations upon inquiry. . . . [C]ongressional inquiry ought
not to be fettered by advance rigidities, because in the light of experience there
can be no reasonable doubt that such curtailment would make effective investigation
almost impossible....
Whatever inconveniences may have resulted are inseparable incidents of an essential exertion of governmental power, and to talk about these incidents is to deflect
attention from wrongdoing and its sources....
The procedure of congressional investigation should remain as it is. No limitations
should be imposed by congressional legislation or standing rules. The power of investigation should be left untrammeled. . . . The safeguards against abuse and folly
which are operating from within
are to be looked for in the forces of responsibility
146
Congress, and are generated from without.

Notice how the right of the individual is minimized: while innocent
people may be harmed, the paramount consideration is that the investiga144. Id. at 50-51. Supporting Judge Hand's position, among other cases, is a recent
Supreme Court decision summarily reversing, without opinion, a judgment in favor of a
farmer who had been fined by a federal ageilcy for raising wheat in violation of a government statute, which wheat was used to feed his own cattle. United States v. Haley, 358
U.S. 644 (1959), reversing 166 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Tex. 1958). The Court obviously felt
that a farmer does not have a constitutional right to plant what he pleases on his own
property, even though the product never leaves the farm.
145. Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations, New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329.
146. Id. at 330-31.
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tion continue unhampered. In 1957, this same Justice concurred in the
Watkins decision'4 7 which severely restricted congressional investigations
of subversion and threatened the very existence of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee.
When Mr. Justice Black was a Senator and the head of a committee
investigating corporations, he thus championed the penetrating publicity
accorded legislative investigating hearings:
Just as persons and firms have been reluctant to exhibit their papers before the
hearings, so they now reveal the same resistance to answering questions. . . . Of
course many merely insist that the question relates to personal and private matters.
• . . This sort of thing taxes severely the patience of an investigator. It accounts
often for what newspaper enemies of investigation refer indignantly to as the
bullying and badgering of witnesses .... Public investigating committees have always
been opposed by groups that have or seek special privileges. The spokesmen of
these greedy groups never rest in their opposition to exposure and publicity .... 148

Black thus maintains it is correct to expose the businessman to "the
rays of pitiless publicity," but on the question of exposing communists,
14
he believes that "exposure for the sake of exposure" is wrong. 1
The reaction of some members of the present Court to the Governmentenforced evacuation of thousands of Japanese-American citizens from
their homes and businesses during the early days of World War II is in
marked contrast to their treatment of communist subversives today. In
Korematsu v. United States,15 0 Mr. Justice Black wrote an opinion,
concurred in by Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, sustaining the conviction of a native-born American citizen whose only offense was to remain
at his home. This harsh handling should be compared with the lenient
treatment accorded to communists by the Court today.''
This double standard is simply a reflection of the present type of
thinking which thoroughly permeates many liberal minds today. It is
especially reflected in matters involving the fifth amendment. As Professor Sidney Hook has said, "there seems to be a double standard of
legal and moral bookkeeping involved in the judgment and sometimes
147.

354 U.S. 178 (1957).

148. Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1936, pp. 283-86.
149. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). In the Senate hearings
held prior to the confirmation of his appointment to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Brennan stated that the investigation and exposure of communists constituted a "vital
function" of Congress. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1957, p. 16, col. 4. Yet, since joining the
Court, he has regarded every exposure of subversives by legislative committees as "exposure
for exposure's sake." See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Uphaus v.
United States, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
150.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).

151. It is interesting to note that J. Edgar Hoover opposed the relocation of the
Japanese-Americans. He wrote the Attorney General and the President that "the whole
operation was based not on public interest but on political pressure and hysteria." Gordon,
Nine Men Against America 59-60 (1958).
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the treatment of Fifth Amendment cases, depending upon the individuals
involved."' 52 Editorial support is tendered Supreme Court decisions
which decry the drawing of inferences from invocation of the fifth amendment when questions relate to Communist Party membership, but
when a labor leader claims this constitutional privilege on non-subversive
matters, his removal from office is demanded because 5of
the cloud of
3
suspicion thus arising from his use of the amendmentY.
When subversives are the targets of congressional committees, liberals
loudly denounce "exposure for exposure's sake." However, they remain
silent when the chief counsel of a senate investigating committee refers
to a national labor figure in the following language:
But I'm not harrassing him. This is an important thing. The only way to get people
to do the job-the courts, the Justice Department, the Congress-is to keep the
pressure on. And keep it on him. This is not maybe the purpose of a congressional
committee. But I think he's a very evil influence in the United States, a tremendous
power, and I just think that something has got to be done about it. If no one else
is going to do it, we will.154

Many Americans have been duped by the outpourings of the efficient
communist propaganda machine. 55 J. Edgar Hoover thus appraises the
effect of this delusion:
To me, one of the most unbelievable and unexplainable phenomena in the fight on
communism is the manner in which otherwise respectable, seemingly intelligent
persons, perhaps unknowingly, aid the Communist cause more effectively than the
Communists themselves. The pseudoliberal can be more destructive156
than the known
Communist because of the esteem his cloak of respectability invites.

IV.

RECENT SuPREKE CouRT DECISIONS AFFECTING INTERNAL
SECURITY

A brief review of some recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly
those at which the A.B.A. resolutions are aimed, will demonstrate that
the Court has frequently ignored precedent and employed fallacious
reasoning in asserting its own personal, and often policy-making, views.
152. Letter to the N.Y. Times, May 10, 1957, p. 26, col. 6.
153. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1957, p. 30, col. 1 (editorial).
154. Quoted in Martin, The Struggle to Get Hoffa (pt. 4), The Saturday Evening Post,
July 25, 1959, pp. 30, 86.
155. See, e.g., the testimony of John W. Hanes, Jr., Administrator, Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, Department of State, in Senate Hearings at 276. Mr. Hanes decribed
how a clever campaign by the Communist Party against the State Department policy of
refusing passports to communists achieved respectability when some sincere people "became
disturbed by the argument that the regulations permitted the Secretary of State arbitrarily
to restrict a citizen's rights." Ibid.
156. Quoted in testimony of Edgar C. Bundy in Hearings on the Limitation of the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court Before the Subcommittee on
Internal Security of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 184 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hearings].
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A. Jencks v. United States
The defendant, a union president, was convicted of filing a false noncommunist affidavit. At his trial, he had requested that certain F.B.I.
reports submitted by two government witnesses be turned over to the
court for inspection to determine their impeachment value. Because no
showing had been made that the reports of the witnesses were inconsistent
with their trial testimony, the request was denied.
The Supreme Court reversed Jencks' conviction, ' holding that the
defendant himself is entitled to unrestricted inspection of any statements or reports "touching the evidence and activities"' 58 about which a
witness has testified. The Court further declared that if the Government
did not produce such statements or reports, then the indictment should
be dismissed.'59
It had been a well-established practice in the federal courts that a pretrial statement of a witness would not be turned over to a party until
(1) there had been a showing of inconsistency, and (2) after the judge
had inspected the statement to determine its relevancy. 6 °
In attempting to bolster its decision, the Jencks Court quoted from
Gordon v. United States 6 ' to the effect that similar requests there (1) did
not entail a broad fishing expedition, and (2) were related to statements
by persons offered as witnesses.162 The Court construed the Gordon case
as holding that these were the only prerequisites for the production of a
witness' statement. Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissent, correctly pointed
out that the Gordon quotations were "lifted entirely out of context."' 63
Immediately preceding them, the Gordon Court had acknowledged that
by a proper cross-examination, "defense counsel laid a foundation for
his demand by showing that the documents were ...

contradictory of his

[the witness'] present testimony ....
The Supreme Court noted with approval Judge Learned Hand's statement in United States v. Andolschek 165 declaring that "prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess."
However, the Second Circuit rule was as clear as it was elsewhere before
the Jencks case. 66 As expressed by Judge Hand himself, "statements
157. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
158. Id. at 668.
159. Id. at 672.
160. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953) ; Goldman v. United States, 313 U.S.
129 (1942).
161. 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
162. Id. at 419.
163. 353 U.S. at 680 n.2.
164. 344 U.S. at 418.
165. 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v.
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of witnesses taken by one party in preparation for trial need not be
disclosed to the opposite party, unless the judge holds on inspection that
their contents is [sic] relevant."' 6 7 The Jencks case, as is typical of
many recent Supreme Court decisions, produced tremendous confusion,
especially on the question of whether or not a defendant was entitled to
receive, prior to the start of trial, the previous statements of prospective
witnesses.
Congress promptly took action to remedy the decision. It agreed
basically with the Court's new rule that a defendant should be entitled
to a witness' pre-trial statement concerning the subject matter of his
testimony, but statutorily revised and limited the effect of the Court's
holding as follows :168

(1) The Government need only produce "written reports" or "substantially verbatim" transcripts of oral statements;
(2) If any report contains matter related to the witness' testimony and
matter not related to his testimony, the trial judge, after inspection
and before the defendant sees it, must remove the unrelated material;
(3) The reports need not be produced until after the witness has testified
at the trial;
(4) The penalty for non-production of the report is striking out the witness' testimony or a mistrial at the judge's discretion.
B. Cole v. Young
In 1950 Congress subjected the employees of eleven specified federal
departments and agencies to a new security program and provided that
the law might be extended to "such other departments and agencies of
the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary
in the best interests of national security."16 9 Pursuant to this authority,
De Normand, 149 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Simonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d
Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944).
167. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1950). judge Hand added
that "while it is true that this deprives the party who is denied inspection of any opportunity to dispute the judge's conclusion, that is unavoidable."- Id. at 639.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). This statute was recently upheld in Palermo v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1217 (1959). The Jencks decision was further modified in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1237 (1959), and Galax Mirror Co. v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1237 (1959), both being 5-4 decisions wherein the Court held that the
Jencks rule did not apply to the production of a witness' grand jury testimony.
169. 64 Stat. 476-77 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22(1)-(3) (1958).
This statute gives a federal employee the right to a written statement of any charges against him and the right to
a hearing. The decision by his agency head is conclusive and final. Act of Aug. 24, 1912,
ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1958), and the Act of June 27, 1944,
58 Stat. 390, 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1958), which are not affected by this decision, permit the discharge of an employee on loyalty grounds, but, among other procedural rights, enable the
employee to appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
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the President issued a 1953 order extending the provisions of the 1950
statute "to all other departments and agencies of the Government."' 70
The loyalty security program was thus enlarged to include all federal
employees.
Under this order, Cole, an inspector in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, was discharged by his agency head on loyalty
grounds, his employment having been found to be not "clearly consistent with the interests of national security." '
Cole had a statutory
right to answer the charges and to have a hearing, but declined to use
it. In going against the plain wording of the statute, the Supreme Court
ruled that Cole's discharge was improper, holding that Congress did
not intend to authorize the President to discharge employees in "nonsensitive positions."' 72 Yet the legislative history of the statute, ignored
by the Court, shows clearly that Congress sought to entrust the President
with this broad power." 3
By this decision, the Court clearly substituted its judgment for that
of the President. Congress authorized the President to extend the security
program whenever he deemed it "in the best interests of national
security" to do so. The Court concluded that national security would not
be served by an extension of the program to persons in "non-sensitive"
positions, thus unduly intruding into an area in which it did not belong.
The reasoning of the Court is unrealistic. A person in a non-sensitive
position, for example, a cleaning woman, might perpetrate acts of espionage resulting in incalculable harm. As a matter of fact, a number of
government employees named as members of communist espionage rings
either got their start in, or actually operated out of, such "non-sensitive"
agencies as the Work Projects Administration, the Agricultural Adjust74
ment Administration, the National Youth Administration, and the like..
It is recognized that reasonable men may differ on how far the governmental security program should be applied, but it is submitted that this is
the prerogative of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, and not the judiciary.
C. Kremen v. United States
In its report, the A.B.A. Special Committee intimated that the Supreme Court was reversing convictions of communists on technicalities.
Interpretation of this phase of its report has led to the charge that the
170. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), as amended by Exec. Order No.
10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (1953).
171. 351 U.S. 536, 540 (1956).
172. Id. at 557.
173. Id. at 567 (Clark, J., dissenting).
174. Hearings on Communist Party Espionage in the United States Government Before
the House Un-American Activities Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 513-14 (1948).
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Committee has described "due process" as a technicality. 75 Such criticism
is manifestly unjust. What the Committee actually suggested was
that under the cloak of "due process," technicalities were being used
to free communist defendants. "Due process" is not a technicality but
neither is every technical deficiency a deprivation of due process.
Kremen v. United States'7 6 is illustrative of the use of hazy technicalities to free subversives. Certain communist leaders, fugitives from
justice, were located by the F.B.I. in a secluded four-room cabin in
California, along with the defendants Kremen, Coleman and another." 7
The F.B.I. possessed arrest warrants but no search warrants. Shortly
after the arrest, a search of the cabin and a seizure of its entire contents
were made, with the latter sent to the F.B.I.'s office in San Francisco
for further examination. The defendants were subsequently convicted
of harboring fugitives and of conspiring to commit that offense.
The Supreme Court reversed their conviction on the sole ground that
"the seizure of the entire contents of the house and its removal some
200 miles away to the F.B.I. offices for the purpose of examination
are beyond the sanction of any of our cases."' 7 8 Not one case was cited
by the Court in support of its opinion, nor did the Court state how and
to what extent the seizure was "beyond the sanction" of previous cases.
No previous case had ever held that the validity of a seizure depended
on the quantity of items seized. There is no question that the arrests
here were valid, and certainly the Supreme Court had previously permitted a complete and thorough search of a home as an incident to a
valid arrest. 7 '
The removal "some 200 miles away to the F.B.I. offices," the Court
felt, was improper. It is difficult to understand what difference it would
have made on the question of defendants' guilt whether articles had been
removed but one mile away or even examined on the premises itself.
Certainly, the technicality that the nearest F.B.I. office happened to be
200 miles away should not be a basis for reversal.
As the dissenting opinion pointed out, 0° only a fragmentary part of
the items seized had been admitted into evidence and at most constituted
harmless error since there was otherwise ample evidence of guilt. The
majority opinion was absolutely silent on this point, leaving one to specu175. Quoted in N.Y. Times, April 19, 1959, p. 82, col. 1.
176. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
177. See Kremen v. United States, 231 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1956), for a full statement of
the facts.
178. 353 U.S. at 347. The Court set forth in a ten-page appendix an inventory of the
seized items, most of which were of a purely personal nature.
179. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (three and a half room
apartment).
180. 353 U.S. at 348.
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late that the Court possibly feels that if any illegally seized material is
received in evidence, no matter how insignificant, a reversal is mandatory.
D. Fifth Amendment Cases
A clear example of the change which has occurred in the Supreme
Court's attitude may be found in fifth amendment cases. Until the communists began to invoke the fifth amendment en masse in congressional
investigations about a decade ago, the Court saw nothing wrong in rebuking those who invoked this constitutional privilege. As far back as
1896, the Supreme Court referred to such an individual as a "self-confessed criminal."' 81
Today, the Supreme Court approves Dean Griswold's statement that
the fifth amendment is "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle
to make himself civilized."' 82 During the earlier part of this century when
the privilege was utilized by non-communists, e.g., officers of large corporations, many liberals favored eliminating the fifth amendment. Mr.
Justice Cardozo, in 1937, asserted that the fifth amendment could be
destroyed without impairing the administration of justice.'8 3 The Supreme
Court had previously pointed out that this privilege is not recognized
in other countries and "is nowhere observed among our own
people in
84
m
the search for truth outside the administration of the law. "
Typical of this attitude was the 1926 statement of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals that honest men do not remain silent when their motives
are assailed.' 85 In 1936, Mr. Justice Black approved the remark of
Woodrow Wilson that "if there is nothing to conceal then why conceal
it? . . . [W]e believe it a fair presumption that secrecy means im-

propriety."' 8 6 Yet in 1955, Chief Justice Warren referred to the possibility of a stigma being attached to invocation of the fifth amendment "in
these times" as though something novel was occurring in our history.'8
181.
182.

Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605 (1896).
Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955), cited in Ullmann v. United States,

350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).

183. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
184. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908). Judge Jerome N. Frank did not
consider the fifth amendment as one of the more important guarantees. United States v. St.
Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 847 (2d Cir. 1942) (dissent). In 1933, Judge Samuel Seabury urged
that the "privilege should be made inapplicable to cases where the subversion of the very
processes of government is involved . . . ." Seabury, Foreword to Herwitz & Mulligan, The
Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1933).
185. United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926).
186. Quoted in Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1936, at
172.
187. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 (1955). Here the Court reversed a
contempt conviction of a witness appearing before the House Un-American Activities
Committee. After the witness had charged that the Committee "was trying perhaps to
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Judge Frank's dissent in United States v. St. Pierre8l

illustrates the

change in thinking that has taken place during the past few years.
In this dissent, written in 1942, he comments that judges who did not
comply with the demand to eliminate the fifth amendment "by emasculat-,
ing interpretations" were deemed to be "reactionary"'! 8 9
Present views regarding the fifth amendment have reached such an
opposite extreme that those who invoke it are regarded by some as heroic
defenders of the Constitution. 90
We are now advised that it is improper to draw any unfavorable inferences from invocation of the amendment. The fallacy in this attitude
is that its admonition is not confined to use in the courtroom. The rules
of law which may prevent men from going to jail are not binding on a
citizen's own appraisal of another's guilt or innocence. For example, a
man may be innocent in the eyes of the law because the statute of
limitations prevents his prosecution, but a citizen is not compelled to
so regard him in the face of damning evidence of guilt.
Outside of the courtroom, certain inferences not only may, but logically
must, be drawn from invocation of the fifth amendment. For example,
if a man is asked whether or not he has ever been a member of the
Communist Party and properly invokes the fifth amendment, the only
possible logical conclusion is that he has been a member of the Communist Party. A negative answer could not conceivably tend to incriminate
him. Whether or not there should also be an inference that he has
committed a crime (by having been a Communist Party member) is
another matter.
Dean Griswold's only answer to the position here taken' 9 ' is that
hypothetically a person invoking the privilege as to Communist Party
frame people for possible criminal prosecution," 349 U.S. at 195, the following dialogue
occurred:
'Mr. Moulder. Is it your feeling that to reveal your knowledge of [individuals witness
asked to identify] . . . would subject you to criminal prosecution?
Mr. Emspak. No. I don't think this committee has a right to pry into my associations.
That is my own position.' Id. at 195-96.
The Government maintained that the witness' answer constituted an effective disclaimer of
the privilege against self-incrimination, but the Court ruled that his reply was equivocal. It
said the Committee should have been ready to recognize a "veiled claim of the privilege."
Id. at 195.
188. 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
189. Ibid.
190. As Professor Hook observes, "those invoking the fifth amendment enjoy a
rhetoric of defense . . . so grandiose that one would imagine honest heretics, instead of
evasive conspirators, were being questioned." Hook, Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment 104-05 (1957).
191. Even those liberal in their views on the fifth amendment concede that fear of
prosecution for perjury in truthfully denying Communist Party membership is not a valid
basis for its invocation. See, e.g., Taylor, Grand Inquest, The Story of Congressional
Investigations 203 (1955); Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 19 (1955).
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membership may not have been a Party member but may have been
affiliated with communist fronts, and if he denies party membership he
may have "to undertake to state and explain" his membership in said
fronts.1" 2 However, Dean Griswold does not say why this person could
not and should not deny party membership and then invoke the privilege
when questioned on the fronts.193
Consonant with its position that no unfavorable inferences should be
drawn from an invocation of the fifth amendment, the Court held in
Slochower v. Board of Educ."' that it was violative of the due process
clause for New York City to discharge a professor who had invoked the
amendment when questioned about Communist Party membership by
a Senate committee. Inasmuch as state action should not be deemed a
deprivation of due process where reasonable men differ as to the propriety
of said action,' 9 5 the Slochower Court, in effect, ruled that it is unreasonable to draw any unfavorable inferences from invocation of the fifth
amendment.' 9 6 The fact is, of course, that reasonable men, such as
former President Herbert Hoover who said that communist spies and
traitors utilizing the fifth amendment should be deprived of their right to
vote, 9 7 do differ on the implications arising from its invocation. Numerous pronouncements by many liberals against the fifth amendment prior
to its wholesale adoption by Communist Party members attest to this.
It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in recent 5-4 decisions has reaffirmed the right of a state to receive answers from its employees to
questions dealing with Communist Party membership.' 98 The Court,
192. Griswold, op. cit. supra note 191, at 19.
193. It has been held that a witness may deny under oath that he committed the crime
being investigated and during the same interrogation properly invoke the privilege when
questioned on details of the crime. People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 38
The
N.E. 303 (1894). See also United States v. Grunewald, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
doctrine of waiver only applies where a man has incriminated himself, in which case he
may be compelled to give details of the incriminating admission, provided that by so
doing, he does not further incriminate himself. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373
(1951).
194.
195.

Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949).

196. Cited with approval was Dean Griswold's work on the fifth amendment, op. cit.
supra note 191, but ignored were Sidney Hook's devastating critique, op. cit. supra note
190, and Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 19 (1955),
which presents a fine rebuttal of current misconceptions of this subject.
197. "Many of these [communist] spies and traitors when exposed sought sanctuary
for their infamies in the Fifth Amendment. Such a plea of immunity is an implication of
guilt. Surely these people should not have the right to vote or hold office, for thereby they
use these privileges of free men against the safeguards of freedom." N.Y. Herald Tribune,
Aug. 11, 1954, p. 6, col. 4.

198. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399
(1958).
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splitting hairs, concluded that if adverse action taken by the state is
based on a refusal to answer, rather than on the invocation of the fifth
amendment, then such action is, proper. In view of these decisions, there
is a possibility that the Court would uphold legislation, such as is recommended by the A.B.A. (Resolution 4(c)),199 requiring, as a condition of
employment, that federal government employees answer all questions on
loyalty put to them by Congress or any federal agency. Employees who
refuse to answer questions pertaining to their loyalty do not belong in the
Government.
E. Yates v. United States
It is unlawful under the Smith Act20 0 for any person (1) to advocate
or teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the
United States by force and violence or (2) to organize any group of
persons who so advocate or teach. In Yates v. United States,201 Communist Party leaders were convicted of conspiring to commit these prohibited acts with the intention of causing the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit.
The conspiracy was alleged to have commenced in 1940 and continued
on through the date of the indictment in 1951.
The trial court had instructed the jury that the word "organize"
includes "'the recruiting of new members and the forming of new units,
and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes and other
units of any society, party, group or other organization.' ,,20

The trial

court also instructed the jury that the Smith Act would be violated if
a person, with the specific intent to cause or bring about the overthrow
and destruction of the Government by force and violence as speedily as
circumstances
would permit, advocated the necessity and duty of such
03
overthrow
The Supreme Court held both instructions were erroneous and awarded
new trials to nine defendants, acquitting the remaining five.2 0 4
1. The "Organizing" Provision
The Court held that the "organizing" provision of the Smith Act is
limited to acts involving the initial organization of a seditious group and
not to any activities thereafter; and ruled that inasmuch as the Com199. A.B.A. Resolutions at 408.

200. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
201. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
202. Id. at 304.
203. Id. at 313-14 n.18.
204. In his dissent, Mr. justice Clark stated that this was the first time in history that
the Supreme Court had ever ordered an acquittal solely on the facts. 354 U.S. at 346.
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munist Party had been reorganized in 1945, a 1951 indictment had
been barred by the statute of limitations in 1948.2"'
The Smith Act, passed in 1940, was aimed particularly at the Communist Party. Since the United States Communist Party was originally
organized in 1919, under the Court's interpretation, the organizing
provision from the outset thus had no application to the Communist
Party. Assuredly this was not the intention of Congress. The Court,
admitting that the legislative history of the Smith Act shows that "concern about communism was a strong factor,"20 6 attempted to demonstrate
that this particular provision of the Act was not written with reference
to the Communist Party by quoting a 1935 statement of Representative
John W. McCormack which, on the contrary, would indicate clearly
that the
bill purported to include communists, but not only commu2 7
nists . o
The Court dismissed dictionary definitions of the word "organizing"
because they show "the term is susceptible of both meanings attributed to
it by the parties here." 2 ' The Government, of course, did not contend
that the term was not susceptible of also meaning "establish," "found" or
"bring into existence," (as contended by the defendants),29 but maintained that this was not the only meaning of the word.
The Yates interpretation of the "organizing" provision of the Smith
Act has virtually stopped all activity by the Department of Justice
under this section.2 10 If Communist Party subversives are to be effectively prosecuted, it is vital that Congress adopt the A.B.A.'s recommendation (Resolution IV(a)) and amend the Smith Act to define
"organize" as including recruitment and other organizational activities.2 '
2.

The "Advocacy" Provision

The Court held that advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the Government is not a violation of the Smith Act if it is "divorced from any
205.

Id. at 310-12.

206.
207.

Id. at 307.
" 'And by the way, this bill is not alone aimed at Communists; this bill is aimed

at anyone who advocates the overthrow of Government by violence and force.'"

Ibid. See

Hearings on H.R. 4313 and H.R. 6427 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, at 3 (1935). The Court completely disregarded

a later statement made by this same legislator in 1939 during a debate on the Act: "[A]
communist is one who intends knowingly or willfully to participate in any actions, legal
or illegal, or a combination of both, that will bring about the ultimate overthrow of our
" 84th Cong. Rec. 10454 (1939).
Government. He is the one we are aiming at ....

208. 354 U.S. at 305-06.
209.
210.

Id. at 304.
Testimony of Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,

Senate Hearings at 407.
211. A.B.A. Resolutions at 408.
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effort to instigate action to that end.1 212 Specifically, the Court ruled

that it is not enough to advocate the necessity of violent overthrow of
the Government and to advocate that it is one's duty to violently overthrow the Government, even though the advocator intends by his advocacy to violently overthrow the Government. The advocacy must 2be
13
accompanied by an urging "to do something, now or in the future.)
Anything short of ' 214
this, the Court ruled, was merely advocacy of an
"abstract doctrine.
Following the Court's reasoning, if an individual, for the purpose of
having a police chief assassinated, stated that the assassination of the
police chief was necessary and further that it was the duty of his listeners to assassinate the police chief, he would not be advocating action,
but would be merely advocating "an abstract doctrine," and therefore,
would be doing nothing criminal. Could it be said that the police chief
would be unreasonable in concluding that the advocator had seriously
jeopardized his well-being?
Indeed, as the Court conceded, the distinction between advocacy in
the abstract with evil intent and advocacy which incites to action is
"often subtle and difficult to grasp." 15
Earlier, in Dennis v. United States,216 in upholding the Smith Act,
the Court ruled that the constitutional test was whether or not the
defendant's advocacy had created a "clear and present danger"21 7 of
overthrowing the Government. Yet, in the Yates case, the Court remained silent as to this principle. In any event, it is clear that the
Court in Yates did not override the ruling of the Dennis case that the
21
advocacy need not stir one to immediate action to be deemed criminal.
Rather, the Court, by some peculiar reasoning, interpreted the Yates
trial court as permitting the defendants to be convicted in the absence
of any incitement to action, present or future.2 19 The Court stated that
the Yates trial judge was in error in not giving the Dennis charge (which
the Government had requested that it do), although it would appear
that in substance the charges were the same.
212. 354 U.S. at 318.
213. Id. at 325.
214. Id. at 312.
215. Id. at 326.
216. 341 U.S. 494.
217. Id. at 503.
218. 354 U.S. 298, 320-21, 324-25.
219. "'The Supreme Court did not repudiate the Smith Act but in interpreting it performed an extraordinary feat of psychological acrobatics. This feat consisted of a gossamerfine distinction between 'advocacy of abstract doctrine' and 'advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action.' . . . And so we come back to our original question-that of the
relationship of the idea (whether qualified as 'abstract' or not) to the act. . . . Who is
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Legislation to clarify this issue is in order. The A.B.A.'s recommendation (Resolution IV(b)) is that the Smith Act be amended to
make it a crime to advocate intentionally the violent overthrow of the
Government. 2 0 The Court has already stated that legislation punishing
advocacy without incitement would be in a clearly marked "constitutional
danger zone." 2 ' Nevertheless, this pronouncement would not affect the
propriety of amending the Smith Act to make it perfectly clear that
intentional advocacy of any action, present or future, to overthrow the
Government is criminal. Such an amendment would eliminate any future
revolving about "subtle and difficult" distinctions
doubts or problems
222
in this area.

F. United States v. Witkovich
An alien against whom a final order of deportation has been outstanding for over six months is, pending eventual deportation, subject to
supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. 2 3
Such regulations may require the alien to give information under oath
"as to his habits, associations and activities," and other matters that
the Attorney General determines to be fit and proper; refusal to do so
is a crime. 2 4
The defendant, who had been under a deportation order for over
six months, was indicted for refusing to answer questions put to him
by the Attorney General under this statute, including queries as to
whether he was presently a member of the Communist Party and had
attended Communist Party meetings since the issuance of his deportation order.
Despite plain statutory language, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Attorney General was entitled to interrogate an alien only as to
those matters which would reflect on the latter's availability for deportation; and questions concerning Communist Party activity were
not in this category. 2 5
In justifying its strained construction of the statute, the Court indicated that it might be unconstitutional to "inhibit" the subversive
capable of drawing the fine distinction between the state of mind of one who teaches
the commission of a crime as a mere 'abstract principle' . . . and the state of mind of one
who . . . instigates its commission?'" Editorial comment of the American Journal of
Psychiatry as quoted in the National Review, March 15, 1958, p. 247.
220. A.B.A. Resolutions at 408.
221. 354 U.S. at 319.
222. The Department of Justice contends that such amendatory legislation is not needed.
See Senate Hearings at 407-08.
223. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1952).
224. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1952).
225. 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
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22
activities of an alien who has been ordered deported for such activities. >
Yet, the Attorney General merely sought information as to the alien's
Communist Party activities in order to determine the nature of the
supervision, if any, that might be required. It is difficult to understand
how imposition of any restrictions on an alien's subversive activities
would be unconstitutional in view of Congress' broad powers concerning
aliens. 2T If Congress may deport aliens, have them fingerprinted and
228
jailed, then why not a congressional right to restrain their activities?
The Witkovich decision thus places the alien under an order of deportation in a better position than other aliens who must report to the
Attorney General when required to do so. In other words, the Attorney
General may require an alien to report and answer questions concerning
communist activities, but once the alien is ordered deported, he may not
be required to so report. It is evident that Congress intended the Attorney General to supervise alien deportees whose past records reveal
dangerous activity. Communist nations frequently refuse re-entry to
their nationals in order to enable them to continue their subversive
activities in the United States, and Congress undoubtedly had this in
mind in passing Section 1252(d).
Legislation permitting the Attorney General to restrict and prohibit
the subversive activities of an alien awaiting deportation, and to interrogate him concerning the same, as recommended by the A.B.A. (Resois imperative as an additional safeguard for our internal
lution IV(d)),
229
security.
G. Bonetti v. Rogers
Petitioner, an alien, arrived in the United States in 1923, was a member of the Communist Party, and in 1937 left the United States, abandoning all rights of residence. In 1938 he was readmitted to the United
States; there was no evidence that he was thereafter a Communist
Party member. The Government sought to deport Bonetti under a
a
statute providing in effect that an alien is deportable if he becomes
230
communist at any time after his "entering" the United States.

226. Id. at 201.
227. See 353 U.S. at 204-05 (Clark, J., dissenting). In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524
(1952), the Court approved detention of an alien during the determination of his deportability.
228. See, e.g., 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (1952) (apprehension and deportation of aliens) ; 66 Stat. 224 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (1952) (registration and fingerprinting
of aliens).
229. A.B.A. Resolutions at 408.
230. Anarchist Act of 1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended, ch. 251, 41 Stat.
1008 (1920), as amended, ch. 439, § 23(a), 54 Stat. 673 (1940), as amended, ch. 1024,
§ 4(a), 64 Stat. 1008 (1950), repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Stating that the language of the statute was ambiguous, the Court
ruled that the word "entering" referred to an "adjudicated lawful admission"2 31 which, for Bonetti, was the 1938 entry since he had previously abandoned all his rights under the 1923 entry.3 2
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark233 very convincingly
establishes that it was Congress' intent that an alien should be deported
if he became a Communist Party member after any entry. Otherwise,
an alien could defeat the purpose of the Act merely by leaving the country and re-entering. In United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,2 34 the Court
had earlier held that the word "entry" included "any coming of an alien
from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming
be the first or any subsequent one."
The majority opinion acknowledged that the effect of its decision is
limited since as of June 27, 1952, any alien who has ever been a
Communist Party member is excludable, and if he enters when excludable, he is deportable even though not deportable if he had not left the
country.235
However, the Court's decision seems to give an unmerited advantage
to an alien who, by design or chance, left the United States after discontinuing membership in the Communist Party. The alien who remains
in the United States after leaving the Communist Party is deportable,
but the traveling alien is not. The A.B.A.'s recommendation that legislation be enacted to provide that aliens who became communists at any
time subsequent to their entry into the United States be deported
(Resolution IV(d)) is thus in order.23
H. Watkins v. United States
The Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction of Watkins,
who, as a witness, had refused to reveal to the House Un-American
Activities Committee whether certain individuals had been known to
him as members of the Communist Party.3 7 Watkins had previously
Stat. 279 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 132-137-10 (1952).

However, the order of deportation here

was issued prior to the date the Act of 1952 became effective. See 356 U.S. at 695 n.6.
231. 356 U.S. at 696-97.
232. Id. at 698.
233. Id. at 700-03.
234. 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933).
235. 356 U.S. at 698-99.
236. A.B.A. Resolutions at 408. An argument proffered against such legislation is that
it would deter alien ex-communists from cooperating with the Government since to do so

might result in their deportation.
249-50.
237. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

See testimony of Robert Fisher, Senate Hearings at
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admitted cooperating with the Communist Party but denied ever having
been a card-carrying member.238
Watkins refused to answer the Committee's questions because, as he
claimed, no "law in this country requires me to testify about persons
who may in the past have been Communist Party members or otherwise
engaged in Communist Party activity but who to my best knowledge
and belief have long since removed themselves from the Communist
movement.1 239 Relying on the first amendment, he charged that the

questions were not relevant to the work of the Committee, which had
no right "to undertake the public exposure of persons because of their
past activities. 2 40
The Supreme Court held that a witness need not answer questions
posed by a congressional committee unless the subject matter of the
investigation appears with "undisputable clarity" or the committee describes "what the topic under inquiry is and the connective reasoning
'
Since the Court
whereby the precise questions asked relate to it." 241
Watkins,
elucidated,
been
not
had
inquiry
under
subject
the
that
ruled
questions.
Committee's
the
answer
to
not
have
therefore, did
Watkins himself, however, never maintained that he was ignorant of
the subject matter of the investigation. He was willing to talk about
his own activities and those of people he believed still in the Communist
Party, but based his refusal to answer the questions in issue on the
ground that no law required him to identify past Communist Party
associates. The Supreme Court did not deal with this objection.
The Court also stated that due process requires that any element of
a criminal offense be expressed with clarity, and that the " 'vice of
vagueness' must be avoided here as in all other crimes. ' 2 However,
this rule applies to the definition of a crime; there is nothing vague
about the statute involved in Watkins which renders criminal a refusal
to answer any query pertinent to the subject under inquiry. Furthermore, pertinency or relevancy has always been considered a question of
law for a court to decide, and not a question of fact. Congressional
and a witcommittees were presumed to be asking pertinent questions,
2 43
ness who refused to answer did so at his own peril.

Requiring an investigator to explain to a witness "the connective
reasoning" whereby the question propounded relates to the topic under
inquiry evinces little knowledge of the process of fact-finding. If an
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 183.
Id. at 18S.
Ibid.
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 209.
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929).
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interrogator must explain with detailed reasoning why each question
objected to is pertinent to the inquiry, he may just as well quit before
starting. Such explanations would not only hinder and delay the questioning, but would destroy any effective investigative technique. For
an interrogator to reveal specifically what he has in mind would often
cue a hostile witness to adopt evasive tactics which he otherwise might
not employ. Furthermore, since investigators are looking for information, their questions, of necessity, must frequently be of an exploratory nature. It is unreasonable to expect them to pinpoint in advance
the areas in which "paydirt" may be struck. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
contended in 1924, "advance
rigidities" would "make effective investi2 44
gation almost impossible.1
Besides holding that the House Un-American Activities Committee's
action in the Watkins case was improper, the Court, in very strong
language, expressed its belief that no investigation by the Committee
would be valid. The Court maintained that instructions by the House
of Representatives to an investigating committee must "spell out that
group's jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity, ' 245 and
indicated that the resolution authorizing the House Un-American Activities Committee was too vague. The Court said it would "be difficult
to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the
meaning of 'un-American' ?11246 So emphatic was the Court's language
that the Watkins case has been interpreted as having turned on the
"readily demonstrable proposition that the committee's investigatory
authorization was unconstitutionally broad. 24
The Court declared that it was not its function to prescribe rigid rules
for congressional drafting of resolutions establishing investigating com244. Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigation, New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329.
In condemning the proposition that a congressional committee must give notice of the purpose of its inquiry, James A. Landis wrote: "That . . . [the committee] must announce
a precise choice before adducing evidence necessary for a proper judgment, is to insist upon
leaping before looking, to require of senators that they shall be seers." Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 221
(1926).
245. 354 U.S. at 201.
246. Id. at 202. The Court went on to assert that "no one could reasonably deduce
from the charter the kind of investigation that the Committee was directed to make." Id.
at 204.
247. Pritchett, The Political Offender and the Warren Court 39 (1958). Yet, the
authorizing resolution of the House Un-American Activities Committee is no broader than
that of many other congressional committees. The Committees on the Armed Services have
been given jurisdiction over "common defense generally." Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, ch. 753, §§ 102, 103, 60 Stat. 815, 824. The Senate and House Committees on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce have jurisdiction over "interstate and foreign commerce
generally." Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, §§ 102, 103, 60 Stat. 817, 826.
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mittees, averring that this was a matter "peculiarly within the realm
of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the courts up
to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected rights of individuals is affected."24' 8 In effect, the Court is saying
to Congress: "You go ahead and make your own rules, and we won't
interfere unless we think we should interfere."
In the course of its opinion, the Court made many unnecessary,
inaccurate, and poorly reasoned statements. For example, it stated:
"Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of
the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible...
19
2 50
and contended that "to expose for the sake of exposure" is improper.
Yet there was not a shred of evidence of any motive of personal aggrandizement on the part of the investigators, of punishment of a witness, or of exposure for exposure's sake. The Court apparently felt
that here was an opportunity to express its own personal views regarding
congressional investigations of communism.
In attempting to contrast our congressional committees with the
Royal Commissions of Inquiry, the Court stated that the latter's "success
in fulfilling their fact-finding missions without resort to coercive tactics
is a tribute to the fairness of the process to the witnesses and their close
adherence to the subject matter committed to them."'2 51 The Court thus
demonstrated its ignorance of the operations of such commissions.
Among other things, a royal commission investigating subversion has
the power to (1) arrest and jail witnesses; (2) hold witnesses without bail and incommunicado for many days and until after they are questioned; (3) compel witnesses to testify and impose sanctions for refusing
to testify; (4) search witnesses' homes and seize their papers; (5) forbid
a witness to have his lawyer present at a hearing; and (6) require all
25 2
concerned including witnesses to take an oath of secrecy.

Congressional committees, of course, have none of these powers.
Furthermore, "royal commissions are not subject to or under the control
of the Courts, Parliament or the Cabinet, and a commission is the
3
25
sole judge of its own procedure.1

248. 354 U.S. at 205.
249. Id. at 187.
250. Id. at 200.
251. Id. at 192.
252. Report of the Canadian Royal Commission, June 27, 1946, pp. 649-84, and English
authorities cited therein, and the Report of the Australian Royal Commission, August 22,
1955, pp. 437-53, summarized in the testimony of Dean Clarence Manion in 1958 Senate
Hearings at 585-86.
253. Testimony of Dean Clarence Manion, 1958 Senate Hearings at 586.
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The Court was critical of investigators who revert "to the past to
collect minutiae on remote topics, on the hypothesis that the past may
reflect upon the present."2'54 But certainly the past often reflects, and
frequently is, the only key to the present.
Contrary to the Court's insinuations, the records of the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee and the House Un-American Activities Committee have indeed been those of accomplishment,2 55 and they have
well merited the praise tendered by the A.B.A. (Resolution V).25
The Court stated that the decade following World War II saw the
emergence of a type of congressional inquiry unknown before in American history, and a "new phase of legislative inquiry [that] involved a
broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens." '5 7
Thus, questioning a man about communist activity is a "broad-scale
intrusion" into his life and affairs, but ruthlessly questioning a man
about his private business affairs, as was done in pre-World War II
inquiries, does not fall into this category. While the Court laments
that persons named before congressional committees as Communist
Party members are placed in the "glare of publicity,"25 one need only
recall Mr. Justice Black's earlier statement that unscrupulous business
25 9
men should be so exposed to wonder at the Court's present concern.
The Court also indicated that because Communist Party members
have been exposed to public stigma, people who might otherwise advance
unorthodox views would not do so for fear of like treatment in the
future.2 ° The Court held congressional investigators responsible for
initiating this reaction. Again, one might ask what is so wrong about
254.

354 U.S. at 204.

255. Some twenty-four new laws were enacted by Congress and forty-eight revisions
in administrative regulations were effected as the result of the recommendations of the
Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Staff of Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative Recommendations by the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee and Subsequent Action Taken by the Congress and the
Executive Agencies (Comm. Print 195). The 1958 report of the House Un-American
Activities Committee reveals that thirty-five legislative measures sponsored by the Committee had been enacted into law and thirteen policy recommendations had been implemented by the executive branch of the Government. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1959, p. 38,
cols. 3-4.
256.

See A.B.A. Resolutions at 409-10.

257.

354 U.S. at 195.

258.

Id. at 197.

259.

See p. 254. Mr. Justice Black's words returned to haunt him in the majority

opinion of Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
case.

260.

354 U.S. at 197-98.

Black dissented in this
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discouraging people from joining organizations which seek to enslave
the whole world?
A friendly analysis explains that what the Court has done in Watkins
"is to try a little psychological warfare on Congress, to see whether it
cannot be frightened or shamed into taking a more responsible view of its
powers."'2 61 It would seem that the warfare was more annihilatory
than psychological.
Fortunately, in Barenblatt v. United States,26 2 decided by a divided
Court after the A.B.A. resolutions were passed, the deadly direction of
the Watkins case was completely reversed. In upholding the contempt
conviction of a witness appearing before the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Court, instead of deriding congressional investigators, emphasized the threat of world communism, admitting that it
would have to ignore international affairs to assume that the Communist Party was an ordinary political party. Most importantly, the
Court upheld the authority of the House Un-American Activities
Committee to investigate communism.20 3 There would now seem to be
no need to rewrite the Committee's basic authorizing resolution, as
recommended
by the A.B.A. (Resolution II) before the reversal of
Watkins.2 64 Since the Barenblatt case also delineated less rigid requirements for elucidating the pertinency of the Committee's questions, 05
there is thus also less need for the A.B.A. recommendation that each
witness be furnished with a copy of the Committee's basic authority
along with his subpoena (Resolution 111).266
I. Sweezy v. New Hampshire
Sweezy was convicted of contempt for refusing to answer certain
questions concerning university lectures he had delivered and his
knowledge of the Progressive Party. The questions were posed by the
Attorney General of New Hampshire, who had been appointed by the
state legislature as a one-man committee to investigate subversion. In
affirming the contempt conviction,2 6 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire had held that the Attorney General was operating within his
261. Pritchett, The Political Offender and the Warren Court 47 (1958).
262. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
263. Id. at 117-18.
264. See A.B.A. Resolutions at 407-08.
265. 360 U.S. at 123-25. The Court pointed out that the subject matter of the instant
inquiry had been identified at the outset as an investigation into communist infiltration
in the field of education. In view of the submission of a memorandum of constitutional
objections prepared by Barenblatt, the latter must have been aware of this subject.
Id. at 116-22.
266. See A.B.A. Resolutions at 408.
267. 100 N.H. 103, 121 A.2d 783 (1956).
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authority since the questions relating to the defendant's lectures might
tend to indicate whether he was a subversive person; and the questions
concerning the Progressive Party might reveal it to be a subversive
organization.
In reversing the conviction,26 the United States Supreme Court held
that the discretion granted the Attorney General to investigate subversion was so broad that it was impossible for the Court to determine
whether or not the state legislature was interested in the information
which the Attorney General had sought.269 It was of no consequence to
the Court that the legislature had already twice ratified the Attorney
General's conduct by authorizing a continuation of his investigation in
the same "form" and "manner." 7 0 Since the highest court of New
Hampshire had already ruled that the Attorney General was directed
to inquire as he did, the Supreme Court should have been bound by
this finding, for it is improper for the Court to overturn state action
in the absence of a deprivation of constitutional rights.
The Court again made a number of statements extraneous to its
ruling. It said: "We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion
of petitioners' liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread."27' 1 The Court attempted no definition of "academic freedom."
The Court also proclaimed that "to impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation.

2

72

This reasoning suggests that although

those who teach the children of the nation exercise a vital function,
no inquiry should be made as to their qualifications or the contents of
their teaching. The Court offers no sound reason why "intellectual
leaders" should be free of the reasonable restraints imposed upon all
other men. Instead, it uttered a very ominous threat for future state
investigations of subversion in education: "We do not now conceive
of any circumstances wherein a state interest would justify infringe'2 7 4
ment of rights . . . 271 in the areas of "individual political freedom"
and "freedom in the community of American universities. ' 275

268. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
269. Id. at 253-54.
270. Id. at 269 (dissent). As Professor Roger C. Cranton observed, "to say that the
State has not demonstrated that it wants the information seems so unreal as to be incredible." Quoted in What 36 State Chief Justices Said About the Supreme Court, U.S.
News and World Report, Oct. 3, 1958, p. 97.
271. 354 U.S. at 250.
272. Ibid.
273. Id. at 251.
274. Id. at 250.
275. Ibid.
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Fortunately, this threat has been diminished, and the effect of the
Sweezy case minimized to a considerable extent, by the recent decisions
in the Barenblatt case and Uphaus v. Wyman, 276 which sustained a
contempt conviction arising from the same investigation of the New
Hampshire Attorney General as had been involved in the Sweezy case.
Uphaus refused to supply the guest list of a summer camp run by the
New Hampshire World Fellowship Center, of which he was executive
director. The Court declared that the nexus between the World Fellowship Center and subversive activities disclosed by the record justified
the Attorney General's investigation. It held that the governmental
interest of self-preservation "outweighs individual rights in an associational privacy.

..

,277 and ruled that Pennsylvania v. Nelson 27 did not

preclude state investigation and prosecution of sedition against the state
79
itself.

The Barenblatt case specifically held that the power of Congress to
investigate the Communist Party is not to be denied because the field
of education might be involved, 28 1 for Congress is not "precluded from
interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational
institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters
that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely
for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls." 2 8 '
J. Pennsylvania v. Nelson
The defendant, an acknowledged member of the Communist Party,
had been convicted under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act of knowingly
advocating the overthrow of the Government of the United States by
force and violence. The United States Supreme Court, affirming 2 2 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed the conviction, 23 held
that the Smith Act of 1940 had superseded the Pennsylvania Sedition
Act and based its decision on three grounds: (1) that Congress intended
to be the exclusive occupant of the field of sedition; (2) that federal
interest is so dominant in the field of sedition that it precludes state
laws on the same subject; and (3) enforcement of state sedition acts
presents a serious4 danger of conflict with the administration of the
28
federal program.
276.
277.

360 U.S. 72 (1959).
Id. at 80.

278. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
279. 360 U.S. at 76.
280. 360 U.S. at 129.
281. Id. at 112.
282. 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Thirty-five states unsuccessfully petitioned the Court to reconsider its decision. Testimony of Frank B. Ober, Senate Hearings at 64.
283. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
284. 350 U.S. at 502-10.
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1. Congressional Intent
The Court asserted that Congress intended to eliminate state prosecutions in the field of sedition,. 5 but did not cite a single passage from
any pertinent statutes indicating such an intention. Nor did the Court,
in support of its position, refer to any hearings or reports of congressional committees, or any statements made by sponsors of pertinent
bills, or any speeches delivered by members of Congress during the
ensuing debates on the bills. No such references were made since all
available evidence would have completely contradicted the Court. For
example, during the debate on the Smith Act, its sponsor, Congressman
'
He is
Smith, declared that his bill "had nothing to do with state laws."286
also on record as stating that Congress never "had the faintest notion of
nullifying the concurrent jurisdiction of the respective sovereign states
to pursue also their prosecutions for subversive activities."2 '
Section 3231 of Title 18, United States Code, of which the Smith
Act is part, provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the
courts of the several States under the laws thereof.

The Supreme Court in Sexton v. California 88 had earlier interpreted
this section as signifying that the states may enact concurrent legislation in the absence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary.
Speaking for the majority in the Nelson case, Chief Justice Warren,
ignoring altogether the Sexton decision, claimed that the paragraph
preserving the states' jurisdiction merely limited the jurisdiction granted
the federal courts. 289 He cited nothing to substantiate this conclusion.
The Court mentioned two cases2 9° for the proposition that broad
treatment of any subject within the federal power bars supplemental
action by states, but both cases dealt with state legislation conflicting
with a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme or plan. The Smith
Act does not create any statutory or administrative regulations and
"there is, consequently, no question as to whether some general con285.

Ibid.

286.

84 Cong. Rec. 10452 (1939).

287. Quoted in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 90, 104 A.2d 133, 148-49 (1957)
(dissent). The Court also ignored the fact that state sedition statutes were already existing
when the Smith Act was passed and that some forty-two were in existence at the time
of its decision. Yet Congress at no time took steps to limit state action in this area.
See 350 U.S. at 514-15 n.4 (dissent).
288.

189 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1903).

289. 350 U.S. at 501.
290. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Charleston & W.C. Ry. v.
Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
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gressional regulatory scheme might be upset by a coinciding state
plan.)

29 1

2. The "Dominant" Federal Interest in the Field of Sedition
The Court held that federal interest in internal security is so dominant as to bar state laws.2 92 Again, there are no continuing regulations
emanating from the Smith Act with which state sedition laws might
interfere, as could be true, for example, in a situation involving federal
regulation of foreign affairs or coinage.
A clear-cut precedent for state sedition statutes is found in Gilbert
v. MinnesotY0 3 where the federal interest in raising armies did not
prevent the Court from allowing Minnesota to punish persons who
interfered with enlistments, even though a comprehensive federal criminal law prohibited identical activity. The Gilbert Court maintained
that a state "has power ...

to restrain the exertion of baleful influences

against the promptings of patriotic duty to the detriment of the welfare
of the Nation and State. To do so is not to usurp a National power,
it is only to render a service to its people .... 21
To circumvent this precedent, Chief Justice Warren asserted that
the Gilbert Court had construed the Minnesota statute as a local police
measure rather than as one relating to the raising of armies for national
defense. 0 5 A reading of the case clearly shows, however, that the
Gilbert Court had interpreted the statute only alternatively and that its
main holding was that states have a concurrent interest in, and therefore a concurrent jurisdiction over, matters dealing with the armed forces.
The argument for invalidating a state statute in Gilbert was much
stronger than in the Nelson case, inasmuch as the Constitution expressly
gives Congress the power to raise armies. No such exclusive power is
granted with respect to sedition.
3. The Danger of Conflict
As sole support for its claim that state sedition acts present a serious
danger of conflict with administration of the federal program, the Court
cited statements by President Roosevelt and by J. Edgar Hoover which
291. 350 U.S. at 514 (dissent). See also Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), where
the Court in upholding a state statute stated: "The principle is thoroughly established that
the exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by
federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conffict is so 'direct and positive'
that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together." Id. at 10.
292. 350 U.S. at 504.
293. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
294. Id. at 331.
295. 350 U.S. at 501.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

urged, in substance, that any espionage or sabotage information obtained by the states should be turned over promptly to the F.B.I. 296
These statements, however, merely reflect the necessity of cooperation
between the states and the federal government which J. Edgar Hoover
has always favored. -97
The Court completely disregarded arguments proffered by the Department of Justice in an amicus curiae brief which pointed out that
administration of existing state sedition laws had yet to impair federal
enforcement of the Smith Act. 9 s The Department counseled that:
The significance of this absence of conflict in administration or enforcement of the
federal and state sedition laws will be appreciated when it is realized that this period
has included the stress of wartime security requirements and the federal investigation and prosecution under the Smith Act of the principal national and regional
Communist leaders .... [T]he Attorney General of the United States recently in-

...that a full measure of federalformed the attorneys general of the several states
2 99
state cooperation would be in the public interest.

Thus we have the Court overturning a state statute partly because
it feared a possible conflict in the administration of the federal and
state statutes, even though those charged with their administration had
no such apprehension. Clearly the Court has interfered where it should
have not.
As the Nelson decision remains objectionable, Congress should act
on the A.B.A.'s recommendation that legislation be passed embodying
Congress' intention that state statutes proscribing sedition against the
3 0
United States shall have concurrent enforceability (Resolution I).1
It is of great importance to the nation that all available competent
manpower be utilized for the detection and prosecution of subversion.
296. Id. at 506.
297. In 1936, Hoover declared: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that the
secret of crime eradication lies not in a national police force but in solidarity and the
combined linking of all law enforcement agencies. It believes in a close-knit cooperation,
each unit capable of handling its peculiar problems, but also, when necessary, of mobilizing
its efforts in a concerted drive against the criminal element of this country." Quoted in
Whitehead, The F.B.I. Story 150 (1956).
298. Quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1955, p. 19, cols 1-4. See also 350 U.S. at 518.
299. Brief for the Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, pp. 30-31. Deputy Attorney
General Lawrence E. Walsh recently testified that whatever conflicts exist between state and
federal law enforcement agencies are of a minor nature, adding that there "aren't enough
people to do the work." Senate Hearings at 402.
300. A.B.A. Resolutions at 407. In a later case, Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76
(1959), the Court held that the Nelson decision had not "stripped the States of the right to
protect themselves," thus upholding state laws prohibiting seditious acts against the state
itself. The Court referred to the Nelson case as holding precisely that the Smith Act
superseded enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribed the same
conduct, "knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the United States by fear and violence. . . . " 360 U.S. at 76.
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V. THE EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON INTERNAL SECURITY
EFFORTS AND COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES

The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York City Bar
Association reports that the A.B.A. Special Committee "offers no support
for its charges" that recent Supreme Court decisions have "encouraged

an increase in Communist activity in the United States or . . . have
caused a 'paralysis of our internal security.' ',301 On the contrary, there
is abundant evidence to justify the conclusions of the A.B.A. Committee.
Fifteen Smith Act conspiracy indictments were filed prior to the
Yates case. Out of 30 pre-Yates defendants who went to trial, 28 were
convicted, and each conviction was affirmed on appeal. Of 84 postYates defendants who went to trial, 76 were convicted, but all convictions were reversed on appeal. Adding the indictments dismissed against
19 defendants who were not tried and that against one defendant who
had a "hung" jury makes a total of 96 defendants who directly benefited
from the Yates decision. Of these 96, all have been freed, except six
who have been retried and convicted in Denver and whose appeal is
pending, and six defendants in Cleveland who have yet to be retried.
The trial time spent by the Government in cases reversed because of the
Yates decision totals 4y2 years. After all this time, to say nothing of
the hours spent in preparation for trial, the net result of the Yates case
is that 84 leaders of the Communist Party have gone scot-free and 12
more may Well be on their way to freedom. The sentences that had
been imposed on these freed Communist Party leaders total 312 years.
It would indeed seem that our "security has been weakened" not only
by putting back into circulation these leaders of the communist conspiracy, thus leaving them free to continue to work for the ultimate

enslavement of the United States, but also by making further prosecutions an extremely hazardous venture. The Yates decision has in truth
rendered the Smith Act almost unusable for the conviction of communists. No new Smith Act conspiracy indictments have been filed since
it was handed down. Of course, not only have federal prosecutions
been crippled, but the Court, through the Nelson case, has prevented
the states from initiating similar prosecutions on the ground that the
now emasculated Smith Act has pre-empted the field.
The following tabulation of the history of these indictments demonstrates that the Supreme Court has indeed made, as one federal judge
has said, "a virtual shambles"3 °2 of the Smith Act.
301.
302.

1958).

14 Record at 255.
Judge Richards H. Chambers in Fujimoto v. United States, 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir.
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Ultimate Disposition

Pre-Yates
1.

New York (S.D.):
12 indicted (1 not
yet tried, too ill)

11 on 10/14/49
(6Y2 mos. trial)

Aff'd, United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

2.

Baltimore:
6 indicted

6 on 4/1/52
(2Y2 mos. trial)

Aff'd, Frankfeld v. United
States, 198 F.2d 679 (4th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 922 (1953).

11 on 1/21/53
(9 mos. trial)

Aff'd, United States v. Flpnn,
216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909
(1955).

New York (S.D.):
21 indicted*
(1 died)

2

3.

Post-Yates
New York (S.D.):
7 indicted
(remaining from
above 21*)

1

6 on 7/31/56
(3Y2 mos. trial)

Rev'd, United States v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.
1958); all ordered acquitted.

4.

Los Angeles:
15 indicted (1 not
tried, too ill)

14 on 8/5/52
(6 mos. trial)

Rev'd, Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); 5 ordered acquitted; 9 new trials;
indictments dismissed at Government's request, 12/2/57.

5.

Honolulu:
7 indicted

7 on 6/19/53
(7Y2 mos. trial)

Rev'd, Fujimoto v. United
States, 251 F.2d 342 (9th Cir.
1958) ; all ordered acquitted.

6.

Pittsburgh:
6 indicted (1 not
tried, too ill)

5 on 8/20/53
(9Y2 mos. trial)

Rev'd, United States v. Mesarosh, 352 U.S. 1 (1956);
indictment dismissed at Government's request, 9/13/57.

7.

Seattle:
7 indicted (1 died)

5 on 10/10/53
(5% mos. trial)

Rev'd, Huff v. United States,
251 F.2d 342
(9th Cir.
1958) ; all ordered acquitted.

8.

Detroit:
6 indicted

6 on 2/16/54
(3 2 mos. trial)

Remanded for reconsideration
in light of Yates, Wellman v.
United States, 354 U.S. 931
(1957) ; rev'd on retrial, 253
F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1958);
indictment dismissed at Government's request, 9/16/58.

1
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Indictments

Acquittals

Convictions

Ultimate Disposition

Post-Yates (continued)
9.

10.

St. Louis:
5 indicted

5 on 5/28/54
(4 mos. trial)

Philadelphia:
9 indicted

9 on 8/13/54
(4 2 mos. trial)

Rev'd, Sentner v. United
States, 253 F.2d 310 (8th Cir.
1958); indictment dismissed
at
Government's
request,
10/10/58.
Rev'd, United States v. Kuzmna, 249 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.

1957); 4 ordered acquitted;
5 new trials, 11/13/57; indictment dismissed at Government's request, 5/15/58.

11.

Cleveland:
11 indicted

5

6 on 2/10/56
(3 mos. trial)

Rev'd, Brandt v. United
State', 256 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.
1958); awaiting new trial.

12.

New Haven:
8 indicted
("hung" jury on
one def.)

1

6 on 3/29/56
(5 mos. trial)

Rev'd, United States v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 761 (2d
Cir. 1957); all ordered acquitted; cert. denied, - 355
U.S. 942 (1958).

13.

Denver:
7 indicted

7 on 5/25/55
(2 mos. trial)

Rev'd, Bary v. United States,
248 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.
1957); indictment re: 1 def.
dismissed at Government's request, 1/27/59; 6 reconvicted, 3/12/59; appeal pending.

14.

San Juan, P.R.
11 indicted

Indictment dismissed at Government's request, 1/10/58.

15.

Boston:
7 indicted (1 died)

Indictment dismissed at Government's request, 11/8/57.

Another illustration of the paralysis of our internal security is seen
in the results flowing from the decision in Kent v. Dulles30 3 The Court
there held that the Secretary of State could not deny passports to communists or persons going abroad to further communist causes, or even
require non-communist affidavits from applicants. John W. Hanes, Jr.,
Internal Security Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs of the State Department, has testified that since this decision,
303. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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some 1,150 persons with known communist affiliations have obtained
passports, among them an increased number of hard-core communists., °4
He stated that "this is a gap in our defense which our enemies have not
been slow to take advantage of. Since the Supreme Court decision in
June 1958, many leading Communists have been able to travel to the
Soviet Union because of the easing of restrictions in the issuance of
American passports.13 3 These communists are thus free to go abroad
to be instructed in plotting the downfall of the United States through
subversion, unhampered by any check on their activities. As discussed
earlier, the Witkovich case prohibits the Attorney General from questioning subversive aliens who have been ordered deported as to their
subsequent subversive activities. Certainly our internal security has
been weakened by these decisions.
The sweeping language of the Watkins case initially threatened to
end completely all effective congressional investigation of subversion.
Because of this decision, the investigations of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee practically came to a standstill, while the House
Un-American Activities Committee operated under the severest handicap.30 6 Fortunately, the Barenblatt case 30 7 has overruled Watkins in a
number of substantial ways, and it is to be hoped that the paralyzing
restrictions of the latter will be eased.
To sum up briefly, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court have
crippled our internal security efforts by, for example, rendering the
Smith Act ineffective, restricting prosecution of subversives by the states,
permitting subversives to travel abroad, preventing the supervision of
subversive aliens, and severely curtailing the power of Congress to
investigate subversion.
Supreme Court decisions also have abetted an increase in communist
activity in the United States. The Yates decision is hailed by a communist leader as "the greatest victory the Communist Party ever had"
and as a case which would "result in the rejuvenation of the Communist
Party in America. 3"° J. Edgar Hoover has frequently attested to the
accuracy of this prophecy. In his year-end report to the Attorney
General, he stated that the American Communist Party during 1957
"'emerged from hiding with new confidence and determination,'" one
304. Testimony of John W. Hanes, Jr., Senate Hearings at 278.
305. Id. at 279.
306. See Rusher, Can Congressional Investigations Survive Watkins?, National Review,
Sept. 7, 1957, p. 201. Congressional investigations of communism are a vital need. As J. Edgar Hoover has admonished: "[W]e may not learn until it is too late to recognize who
the communists are, what they are doing, and what we ourselves, therefore, must do to
defeat them." Foreword to Hoover, Masters of Deceit at vii (1958).
307. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
308. Quoted in Gordon, Nine Men Against America 143 (1958).
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reason for its increasing boldness being a continued success in " 'invoking legal technicalities and delays.' ,,309 Exploitation of Supreme Court
decisions has, beyond any doubt, encouraged this increased Communist
activity.
VI. OTHER CRITICS OF THE COURT

The American Bar Association has not been alone in criticizing recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. On August 23, 1958,
meeting in Los Angeles, California, the Conference of State Chief Justices,
in an unprecedented move, overwhelmingly approved a highly critical
report which expressed grave concern over the Supreme Court's exercise
of "almost unlimited policy making powers" and stated that recent
decisions raised considerable doubt as to whether ours is a government
of laws or of men."1 0 Impelled to speak out to uphold "respect for
law,"M11 the jurists, including the eminent Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, Albert Conway, approved the following resolution:
Resolved: . . . That this Conference hereby respectfully urges that the Supreme
Court of the United States, in exercising the great powers confided to it for the determination of questions as to the allocation and extent of national and State powers,
respectively, and as to the validity under the Federal Constitution of the exercise
of powers reserved to the States, exercise one of the greatest of all judicial powersthe power of judicial self-restraint-by recognizing and giving effect to the difference
between that which, on the one hand, the Constitution may prescribe or permit,
and that which, on the other, a majority of the Supreme Court, as from time to time
constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable, to the end that our system of
federalism may 31continue
to function with and through the preservation of local
2
self-government.

Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
scored the Supreme Court's encroachment on the legislative domain as
"a patent usurpation" of power, 1 3 declaring that he never has been
able to understand on what basis the Court asserted or could assert its
notions of what was good for the community, "except as a coup de
main. ' 314 One cannot "frame any definition that will explain when the
Court will assume the role of a third legislative chamber and when it
will limit its authority to keeping Congress and the states within their
accredited authority." 315 Hand contends that "it certainly does not
309.

310.
Report,
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Quoted in the National Review, Jan. 11, 1958, p. 29.

What 36 State -Chief Justices Said about the Supreme Court, U.S. News & World
Oct. 3, 1958, pp. 92, 102.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 92.
Hand, The Bill of Rights 42 (1958).
Id. at 55.
Ibid.
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accord with the underlying presuppositions of popular government to
vest in a chamber, unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power to
supress social experiments which it does not approve.1 316 He decries
judicial intervention in due process cases unless it appears that the
statutes concerned are not "honest choices between values and sacrifices
honestly appraised." 317
Other jurists, state and federal, have been less restrained in voicing
18
their disapproval of the Court.
Professor Edwin S. Corwin, noted authority on constitutional law,
has described the Watkins and Yates decisions as "irresponsible" and
"vicious nonsense," and the Cole holding as "weird.1 31 9 He asserts that
"the country needs protection against the aggressive tendency of the
Court. ' 32 ° Other legal experts have also criticized the recent propensities of a Supreme Court which, as one observer remarked, "has embarked upon a campaign to effectuate the personal preferences and
philosophies of its members. 32 1
316. Id. at 73.
317. Id. at 66.
318. For example, Honorable M. T. Phelps, senior justice of the Arizona Supreme
Court declared: "It is the design and purpose of the Court to usurp the policy-making
powers of the Nation.... I honestly view the Supreme Court, with its present membership
and predilections, a greater danger to our democratic form of government and the American
way of life than all forces aligned against us outside our boundaries." Quoted in 104 Cong.
Rec. 12120 (daily ed. July 10, 1958). United States District Court Judge George Bell Timmerman has asserted the Supreme Court is a " 'hierarchy of despotic judges that is bent on
destroying the finest system of government ever designed.'" Quoted in N.Y. Times, July 26,
1957, p. 6, col. 7. Of the 128 out of 351 active federal judges who replied to questionnaires
mailed them, 547 agreed that the Supreme Court "too often has tended to adopt the role
of policy maker without proper judicial restraint." How U.S. Judges Feel About the Supreme Court, U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 24, 1958, p. 36. That criticism of the
Supreme Court by other judges is nothing new may be seen in the following statement
of Chief Justice Roane of Virginia concerning an opinion of John Marshall: "'A most
monstrous and unexampled decision. It can only be accounted for by that love of power
which history informs us infects and corrupts all who possess it, and from which even the
upright and eminent judges are not exempt.'" Quoted in Freund, The Supreme Court
Crisis, 31 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 66 (1959).
319. Letter from Edwin S. Corwin to the N.Y. Times, March 16, 1958, § 4, p. 10E,
col. 6.
320. Ibid.
321. Testimony of Lloyd Wright, former Chairman of the Commission on Governmental
Security, Senate Hearings at 461. Wright continued: "As Prof. Herbert Wechsler of the
Harvard Law School recently demonstrated in his Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at the
school, the Court has failed to adhere to principle or to support its decisions with reason.
Often its conclusions are handed down without opinion and sometimes without argument.
Precedent is ignored and discarded, and decisions have been delayed and postponed in
what appears to some observers to be a calculated campaign of waiting until public
opinion is ripe to receive some new policy-timing that would be admirable in a political
statesman but ill-becomes a judge.
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CONCLUSION

The present members of the Supreme Court have assumed an unrealistic attitude towards the Communist Party in the United States.
They have ignored warnings of former Communist Party members, congressional committees, the F.B.I. and other governmental agencies, and
have instead imposed their own views on the nation in the form of policymaking decisions beneficial to the Communist Party and its members.
Particularly disturbing has been the Court's disregard of precedent. The
frequency with which the Court has overturned previous decisions has
led to great instability and confusion in the law. The value of the Supreme
Court is greatly diminished when its decisions are predicated upon
what five justices personally happen to feel is best for the country.
Furthermore, in its rulings involving communists, it is clear that the
Court has frequently employed a double standard. Such use by the
Court is typical of many liberal leaders of the nation. They have constantly switched principles depending on what happens to have been at
stake. When the Court handed down rulings which they disfavored,
these liberals were quick to condemn the Court, but now breathe fire
at any hint of criticism. 2 2 It is illogical to maintain, as some now
do, that legislation remedying Supreme Court decisions constitutes an
attack on the Court as an institution. 2 3
When members of the bar disagree with Supreme Court decisions, it
is their right, and indeed their duty, to criticize these decisions and to
suggest appropriate remedies. Hence, the report and resolutions of the
American Bar Association are completely justified.
As pointed out by the Association, the remedy for poor decisions lies
not in drastic curtailment of the Court's jurisdiction, but rather in enacting appropriate legislation to cure those statutory deficiencies which the
"Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School has been an outspoken critic of
some aspects of the internal security system, but he, too, has taken the Court to task
for its current practice of delivering broad statements of law unrelated to the case before it,
causing confusion and doubt.
"The efforts of the States to combat the peril of the Communist conspiracy have been
weakened or destroyed by a line of decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States
similar in all respects to the decisions which have emasculated the Federal security system."
Id. at 461-62.
322. On the other hand, it may be said with some justification that there are conservatives who now strive to limit the jurisdiction of the Court who were among its strongest
defenders when President Roosevelt attempted to pack it. See, e.g., Westin, When the
Public Judges the Court, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 16. When the
progressives made their onslaught on the Court, "it was considered by the conservatives
as little short of treason to question the legitimacy of . . . [the Court's] power or to
criticize the manner of its exercise." 1 Boudin, Government by Judiciary 1 (1932).
323. See, e.g., testimony of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Senate Hearings at 214. See also statements of Senators Thomas C. Hennings and Jacob K. Javits. Id. at 507-08, 513.
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Court maintains exist. Many .of the cases decided adversely to internal
security efforts have turned on the Supreme Court's interpretation of a
particular statute, thus leaving the door open for Congress to correct
any erroneous construction. There are presently pending numerous bills
in Congress which endeavor to rectify Supreme Court decisions on subversion. It is hoped that Congress will not procrastinate in passing the
more imperative of these. It is realized, however, that even the passage
of new legislation may not be sufficient to thwart a Supreme Court bent,
for example, on destroying the basic purpose of the Smith Act. But, on
the other hand, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would
regard as constitutional legislation restricting its jurisdiction. A constitutional amendment is always available, if all else fails.
As in the past, changes in the composition of the Court are altering
the trend of its decisions. Many of the A.B.A. proposals may no
longer be necessary in view of the recent Barenblatt and Uphaus cases.
The two latest additions to the Court, Justices Whittaker and Stewart,
have generally sided with the Government in subversion cases, and it is
possible that with other replacements many of the bases for the current
complaints against the Court will soon disappear. At present, the Court
is being criticized for its decisions in the field of subversion. Twenty
years from now it will be excoriated for its pronouncements in some
other area.
Sentiments expressed in another setting accurately reflect the views
held by many today:
Reluctant as we are to criticize our supreme judicial tribunal, we cannot but observe
that when the members of that tribunal write long and varying opinions in handing

down a decision, they must expect that intelligent citizens of a democracy will study
and appraise these decisions ....
[Traditional] . . . sanctions of our law, life and
government are challenged by a judicial propensity which deserves the careful thought
and study of lawyers and people ....
[If the Supreme Court's philosophy] . . . is to
prevail in our Government and its institutions, such a result should, in candor and
logic and law, be achieved by legislation adopted after full, popular discussion and
not by the judicial procedure of an ideological interpretation of our Constitution.
We therefore hope and pray that . . . novel [interpretations] . . . adopted by the
Supreme Court will in due process be revised. To that end we shall peacefully and
324
patiently and perseveringly work.
324. Statement of the American Hierarchy, Nov. 20, 1948, in Catholic Mind, Jan. 1949,
pp. 58, 62-64.

